bolyra

@bolyra/mcp

Gate MCP tool calls so only authorized agents can call sensitive tools.

Quick Start (60 seconds)

npm install @bolyra/mcp @bolyra/sdk @modelcontextprotocol/sdk

import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
import { withBolyraAuthStdio } from '@bolyra/mcp';

const server = new McpServer({ name: 'my-server', version: '1.0.0' });

server.tool('read_file', { path: { type: 'string' } }, async (args) => ({
  content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Reading ${args.path}` }],
}));

withBolyraAuthStdio(server.server, {
  devMode: true,
  toolPolicy: {
    // 1n = READ_DATA, 2n = WRITE_DATA (BigInt — add 'n' suffix)
    read_file: 1n,
  },
});

That's it. Every tools/call now requires a valid Bolyra proof bundle.

Dev mode (full example)

Dev mode uses mock proofs — no circuit artifacts, no trusted setup, instant startup. Use it to build and test your server before wiring real ZKP verification.

import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';
import { withBolyraAuthStdio } from '@bolyra/mcp';

// Server
const server = new McpServer({ name: 'my-server', version: '1.0.0' });

server.tool('read_file', { path: { type: 'string' } }, async (args) => ({
  content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'file contents...' }],
}));

withBolyraAuthStdio(server.server, {
  devMode: true,
  toolPolicy: {
    // 1n = READ_DATA, 2n = WRITE_DATA (BigInt — add 'n' suffix)
    read_file: 1n,
    write_file: 2n,
  },
});

await server.connect(new StdioServerTransport());

Client side:

import { createDevIdentities, attachBolyraProof } from '@bolyra/sdk';

const { human, agent } = await createDevIdentities();
const auth = await attachBolyraProof(human, agent, { devMode: true });

// stdio
await client.callTool({ name: 'read_file', arguments: { path: '/tmp/x' }, _meta: auth.meta });
// HTTP
await fetch('/mcp', { headers: { ...auth.headers }, ... });

How it works

Every tools/call request must carry a proof bundle: a pair of Groth16 proofs (one from the human's circuit, one from the agent's) bound to a shared session nonce.

The server side:

1. Extracts the bundle from params._meta.bolyra (stdio) or the Authorization: Bolyra <base64> header (HTTP).
2. Verifies the handshake — both proofs, nonce freshness, score floor.
3. Checks the tool's permission policy against the agent's effective bitmask.
4. Attaches a BolyraAuthContext to the request for downstream handlers.
5. Rejects with an MCP error if any step fails.

Discovery calls (initialize, tools/list) pass through unauthenticated.

Delegation chains (v=2 bundles) narrow scope from root credential to leaf agent across multiple hops. The effective bitmask seen by tool policies is always the leaf's — the most-restricted scope.

API reference

Server — stdio

withBolyraAuthStdio(server: McpServer, config: BolyraMcpConfig): void

Wraps an McpServer instance. Must be called before server.connect(transport).

Server — HTTP

bolyraAuthMiddleware(config: BolyraMcpHttpConfig): express.RequestHandler

Express middleware. Mount before your MCP HTTP handler. Rejects unauthenticated tools/call requests with HTTP 401.

Client helpers

attachBolyraProof(
  human: HumanIdentity,
  agent: AgentCredential,
  options?: AttachProofOptions,
): Promise<BolyraClientAuth>

Runs a handshake and returns { headers, meta, bundle }. Pass options.devMode = true to skip real proving and emit a mock bundle.

attachDelegatedBolyraProof(
  human: HumanIdentity,
  rootCred: AgentCredential,
  hops: DelegationHopSpec[],
  options?: AttachProofOptions,
): Promise<BolyraClientAuth>

Like attachBolyraProof but walks a delegation chain and returns a v=2 bundle.

Verification

verifyBundle(bundle: BolyraProofBundle, config: BolyraMcpConfig): Promise<BolyraAuthContext>

Verify a bundle directly — useful for custom transports or offline verification.

checkToolPolicy(
  toolName: string,
  ctx: BolyraAuthContext,
  policy: ToolPermissionPolicy,
): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string }

Check a BolyraAuthContext against a tool's required bitmask.

Dev identities (re-exported from SDK)

createDevIdentities(options?: DevIdentityOptions): Promise<DevIdentities>

Returns fixed-seed { human, agent, operatorKey } — deterministic, no circuit artifacts required. Logs a warning on first call. Never use in production.

Production configuration

Swap devMode: true for a real resolveCredential resolver and point the SDK at your circuit artifacts:

withBolyraAuthStdio(server, {
  resolveCredential: async (commitment) => myRegistry.get(commitment),
  toolPolicy: {
    // 1n = READ_DATA, 2n = WRITE_DATA (BigInt — add 'n' suffix)
    read_file: 1n,
    write_file: 2n,
  },
  sdkConfig: {
    circuitDir: '/path/to/circuits/build',
    rpcUrl: 'https://sepolia.base.org',
    registryAddress: '0x2781dF8b6381462d881C833Fb703d68c661c9577',
  },
});

Full config interface:

interface BolyraMcpConfig {
  network?: string;          // DID network label (default: 'base-sepolia')
  minScore?: number;         // Minimum score floor 0–100 (default: 70)
  maxProofAge?: number;      // Nonce freshness window in seconds (default: 300)
  toolPolicy?: ToolPermissionPolicy;
  devMode?: boolean;         // Mock verification — dev/test only
  resolveCredential?: (commitment: string) => Promise<AgentCredential | null>;
  sdkConfig?: BolyraConfig;
}

The HTTP variant adds authScheme?: string (default "Bolyra").

Transport guide

Transport	Bundle location	Notes
stdio (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline)	params._meta.bolyra	MCP spec defines no stdio auth surface; _meta is the only protocol-level field
HTTP / SSE / Streamable-HTTP	Authorization: Bolyra <base64-bundle>	Custom auth scheme per RFC 7235; aligns with OAuth 2.1 resource-server pattern

Both produce the same BolyraAuthContext on the server side. Tool handlers don't need to know which transport was used.

Example

See examples/protected-file-server/ for a complete stdio server + client pair using dev mode. Run it with:

cd integrations/mcp
npm run example:protected-file-server