PatchLabs

PatchLabs

Leak checks and tested fixes for AI-built apps: https://patchlabs.dev

Part	Where	Runs on
docs/	Website: landing page, check status and report page, privacy	GitHub Pages (patchlabs.dev)
api/	FastAPI: checks, accounts, workspaces, monitored apps, receipts, free RLS tool, MCP (see API below)	Azure Container Apps (api.patchlabs.dev)
db/schema.sql	Postgres schema, idempotent and additive; applied by the API on start	Azure Database for PostgreSQL, database patchlabs
worker/	Takes verified checks, runs the lab pipeline (Docker + Claude Code), posts reports; deletes run folders older than 30 days	Manraj's Mac, kept alive by launchd

Flow

1. Visitor enters a GitHub repo and email on patchlabs.dev → POST /checks.
2. They prove the repo is theirs by committing patchlabs-verify.txt with a one-time code → POST /checks/{id}/verify.
3. The worker claims the check (POST /worker/claim), rebuilds the database from the repo's migrations in a lab, finds personal data the wrong people can read, has the fix agent write a fix (Haiku first, escalating to Sonnet then Opus only if the lab proof fails), and posts the report (POST /worker/checks/{id}/result).
4. The check page shows the report, the proof table and the fix, and offers the fix as a download. An email goes out at each step once SMTP is configured.

API

Contract: SPEC.md. JSON everywhere; errors are {"detail": "..."}. Signed-in calls send Authorization: Bearer <session>, CI calls send X-API-Key: pl_live_..., worker and admin calls send their bearer tokens.

Module	Endpoints
app.py	GET /health, POST /checks, GET /checks/{id}, POST /checks/{id}/verify, POST /worker/heartbeat|claim (claim also runs the scheduler), POST /worker/checks/{id}/result, GET /admin/checks
accounts.py	POST /workspaces/{wid}/webhook/rotate-secret, POST /auth/start|finish|logout, POST /invites/accept, GET|PATCH|DELETE /me, GET /me/export, GET /me/checks, GET|PATCH /workspaces/{wid}, POST /workspaces/{wid}/webhook/test, POST /workspaces/{wid}/invites, DELETE /workspaces/{wid}/invites/{id}, PATCH|DELETE /workspaces/{wid}/members/{uid}, GET|POST /workspaces/{wid}/api-keys, DELETE /workspaces/{wid}/api-keys/{kid}, POST /workspaces/{wid}/upgrade-request, GET /admin/workspaces, PATCH /admin/workspaces/{wid}, GET /admin/upgrade-requests
monitor.py	GET|POST /workspaces/{wid}/apps, GET|PATCH|DELETE /apps/{aid}, POST /apps/{aid}/verify, POST /apps/{aid}/checks, GET /badge/{aid}.svg, GET /public/apps/{aid}, GET /stats, POST /v1/apps/{aid}/checks, GET /v1/checks/{cid}
receipts.py	POST /checks/{id}/decision, POST /checks/{id}/answers, GET /checks/{id}/decisions (members), GET /receipts/{id}, GET /.well-known/patchlabs-receipt-key
rls.py	POST /tools/rls-check
mcp_server.py	POST /mcp (tools: rls_check, start_check, get_check, list_apps, run_check)

Env: DATABASE_URL, WORKER_TOKEN, ADMIN_TOKEN, SITE_URL, CORS_ORIGINS, SMTP_*, RECEIPT_PRIVATE_KEY (required: base64 of a 32-byte Ed25519 seed, python3 -c "import os,base64;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(32)).decode())"; the API refuses to start without it unless PATCHLABS_DEV=1), optional GITHUB_TOKEN, FOUNDER_EMAIL. Test hooks: EMAIL_OUTBOX, GITHUB_API, RAW_GITHUB. Security rules (rate limits, verification, masking): see "Security rules" in SPEC.md.

Webhooks are signed: X-PatchLabs-Signature: v1=<hex HMAC-SHA256 of "<timestamp>.<raw body>"> with the workspace's whsec_ secret and X-PatchLabs-Timestamp; verification snippet at https://patchlabs.dev/docs/webhooks#security.

Verify a receipt (signed bytes are the receipt as JSON with sorted keys and (",", ":") separators):

import base64, json, urllib.request
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
API, CHECK = "https://api.patchlabs.dev", "<check id>"
r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(f"{API}/receipts/{CHECK}"))
k = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(f"{API}/.well-known/patchlabs-receipt-key"))
assert r["key_id"] == k["key_id"], "signed with a different key"
msg = json.dumps(r["receipt"], sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
pub = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(base64.b64decode(k["public_key"]))
pub.verify(base64.b64decode(r["signature"]), msg)  # raises InvalidSignature if anything was changed
print("receipt is genuine:", r["receipt"]["status"], r["receipt"]["tables_leaking"])

Tests: tools/test-api.sh runs the whole suite in Docker (throwaway postgres:17 + python:3.13-slim) and cleans up after itself; extra arguments go to pytest, e.g. tools/test-api.sh -k webhook -x.

Deploy the API

TAG=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M)
az acr build -r sponsorjobsregistry -t patchlabs-api:$TAG -f api/Dockerfile .
az containerapp update -g ics-rg -n patchlabs-api --image sponsorjobsregistry.azurecr.io/patchlabs-api:$TAG

Before the first v2 deploy, set RECEIPT_PRIVATE_KEY as a secret on the container app: without it the new image won't start.