About sign-cli
sign-cli is an e-signature CLI with offline PAdES signing and support for Dropbox Sign, DocuSign, and SignWell. It serves agents, signers, and auditors; its MCP server provides request, verification, and audit tools while keeping the signing gesture human-gated.
Key features
- 01Create PAdES-signed PDFs offline
- 02Support three hosted signing providers
- 03Use time-limited, per-signer approval tokens
- 04Record audit events in a hash chain
- 05Verify signed PDFs and audit chains
- 06Offer read-only mode and signer prompts
Use cases
- 01Sign and verify contract PDFs offline
- 02Send multi-signer requests through hosted providers
- 03Inspect signed files and certificate details
- 04Give agents controlled access to signing requests and audit queries
MCP support
The MCP server exposes 19 read-only and mutating tools, three resource shapes, and four prompt templates. Read-only mode is available, and the signing gesture remains human-gated.
Configuration
Local server config is the same for every client. Copy it into your client’s MCP config file.
Tools
Local servers expose tools only once running on your machine, and the maintainer has not provided a tool list.
Details
From the project README
sign-cli
Fully-offline e-signature CLI. The built-in PAdES signer (PKCS#7 in /ByteRange, self-issued cert) produces real, cryptographically verifiable signed PDFs with no signup and no third-party provider — or routes through Dropbox Sign / DocuSign / SignWell when you need an external trust anchor. Per-signer approval tokens (TTL-bounded, scoped to one email), hash-chained audit events, RFC 3161 timestamping, named profiles, a 19-tool MCP server, and a 20-route HTTP API.
The asymmetry is the architecture: an agent can drive every step except the actual signing gesture, which stays gated behind a human.
Part of the contract-ops CLI suite — optional. sign-cli works entirely on its own; it's also the signing + audit step of the contract-ops suite: template-vault-cli → draft-cli → nda-review-cli → docx2pdf-cli → sign-cli, with drift detection via compare-cli.
Run this
npx @drbaher/sign-cli demo
That single command runs the entire lifecycle — create (consent + email-verification gates on) → send → watch the gates block signing → verify email → capture consent → approve → sign → verify chain → export receipt — against the offline local provider, then deletes everything. No signup. No keys. ~5 seconds.
Live demo → — read-only, resets every 4 hours. Self-host: see
deploy/README.md.
Where to go next
| If you are… | Start here |
|---|---|
| A new user evaluating the tool | This README's Quick start, then Standard user journey |
| An operator wiring up a hosted provider | docs/setup/ — Dropbox / DocuSign / SignWell / embedded |
| An LLM agent driving the CLI | AGENTS.md → docs/agent-guide.md → docs/recipes/ |
| An auditor verifying a signed bundle | docs/reference/audit-chain.md, docs/reference/legal.md |
| A contributor | docs/reference/architecture.md, docs/regression-testing.md |
| Adding a new CLI to the suite | The build-a-CLI playbook — the conventions every suite CLI follows |
Concept deep-dives live in docs/reference/; task-oriented recipes in docs/recipes/.
Quick start
# Install
npm i -g @drbaher/sign-cli
# Or run without installing
npx @drbaher/sign-cli demo
# After install, the binary is named `sign`
sign --version
sign demo
sign init # wizard: provider selection + .env
sign doctor preflight # structured per-check readiness report
Or download a standalone binary from Releases — ./sign-linux-x64 demo. See DISTRIBUTION.md for every install path.
What this gives you
- Offline PAdES signing with a self-issued cert — real PKCS#7 signed PDFs, no signup, no API keys.
- Three hosted providers when you need them: Dropbox Sign, DocuSign, SignWell. Same surface across all four.
- Per-signer approval tokens (single-use, TTL-bounded, tied to one email). Tokens go to the human, not the agent.
- Consent + attribution evidence, opt-in per request:
--require-consentgates signing on a recorded intent-to-sign attestation + electronic-records consent (versioned canonical texts, hashed into the audit chain);--require-email-verificationgates it on a mailbox-control code;signer record-identitylogs how identity was checked out-of-band. No KYC data is collected — by design. See docs/reference/consent-and-identity.md. - Hash-chained audit chain with append-only DB triggers + RFC 3161 anchors. See docs/reference/audit-chain.md.
- Idempotent
request send— refuses to double-send unless--force true; pair with--idempotency-keyfor safe retries. - Multi-document + multi-signer requests; CSV-driven bulk send.
- Templates from each provider's dashboard via
request from-template. - Auto-detect signature field (
sign pdf detect-signature-field+sign sign --auto-place). Detects AcroForm/Sigwidgets and anchor text in English + French/EU conventions. - Inspect any signed PDF with
sign pdf inspect— parses PAdES PKCS#7 from sign-cli or any other producer (Adobe, DocuSign, Dropbox Sign, SignWell). Returns signer CN/email, cert subject + issuer, validity window, fingerprint, trust label (self_signed_local/self_signed_other/ca_signed/unknown), and message-digest match. - Counter-sign visibility —
signer fetch-documentand the MCPsigner_fetch_documenttool surfaceexistingSignatures, so a signer can see what they're countersigning before they sign. - One-shot DOCX → sealed PDF via
sign document(chains the bundled docx2pdf-cli, auto-place, stamp, PAdES-seal, verify in one call against a scoped temp DB). - Sandbox via
--read-only trueon bothmcp serveandserve. Mutating tools/routes returnFORBIDDEN_READ_ONLY. - Path-traversal guards on every input and output path. See docs/reference/security-controls.md.
- Named profiles bundle provider + dbPath + credentials (with
{{env:VAR}}references for shell-managed secrets). See docs/reference/profiles.md. - PDF verification end-to-end offline:
request verify-signed-pdfrecomputes the digest, extracts X.509 signer certs, supports--recipient <email>for a redacted single-signer view, and reports per-signertrustlabels.
Standard user journey
sign request create \
--title "Mutual NDA" \
--document ./nda.pdf \
--signer name:Alice,email:[email protected],order:1 \
--signer name:Bob,email:[email protected],order:2 \
--provider signwell
sign approve --request-id <id> --token <token1>
sign approve --request-id <id> --token <token2>
sign request send --request-id <id> --provider signwell --test-mode true
sign request watch \
--request-id <id> --provider signwell \
--interval-seconds 5 --fetch-final true \
--out ./signed.pdf
sign audit show --request-id <id>
Or fully offline:
sign request create --title "Mutual NDA" --document ./nda.pdf \
--signer name:Alice,email:[email protected],order:1 \
--signer name:Bob,email:[email protected],order:2 \
--provider local --auto-approve true
sign request send --request-id <id> --provider local
# Each signer runs:
sign sign --request-id <id> --token <their-token> \
--require-hash <sha256> --require-title "^Mutual NDA$"
For full provider-specific setup, see docs/setup/.
One-shot DOCX → sealed PDF
sign document contract.docx \
--signer "Alice Founder" --signer-email "[email protected]" \
--name-signature "Alice Founder" --auto-place first \
--out contract.sealed.pdf
sign document chains: convert (via the bundled docx2pdf-cli) → detect signature field → stamp → PAdES-seal → verify chain. All intermediate state lives in a scoped temp DB.
MCP server (for LLM agents)
sign mcp serve # stdio MCP server
sign mcp serve --read-only true # sandboxed: mutating tools return FORBIDDEN_READ_ONLY
sign mcp tools # print the catalog (live; don't hardcode the list)
19 tools, split read-only vs mutating. Backed by the same SignCliError envelopes you'd see at the CLI. The full discovery contract, wire-up snippets (Claude Desktop, Cursor), and read-only walkthrough are in AGENTS.md. Three resource shapes (request://<id> snapshot, .../document PDF blob, .../audit chain) and four agent-as-signer prompt templates (review_and_sign, policy_check, inbox_triage, verify_receipt) are also exposed.
HTTP API (for non-MCP clients)
sign serve --port 4000 --auth-token <t> --read-only true --rate-limit 5
curl http://127.0.0.1:4000/v1/openapi.json # discover the route catalog
Twenty routes under /v1/*, 1:1 parity with the MCP tool surface — same input shape, same path-traversal guards, same read-only gating. Bearer auth via --auth-token or SIGN_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN. Responses are { ok, result } on success or the standard error envelope on failure.
Signer-side flow (agent-friendly)
For --provider local, an agent can act as a signer end-to-end without an email link. Set SIGN_LOCAL_AUTOCOMPLETE=false so the local provider holds at sent until each signer explicitly runs sign sign.
# As the requester (agent or human)
sign request create --title "Mutual NDA" --document ./nda.pdf \
--signer name:Alice,email:[email protected],order:1 \
--signer name:Bob,email:[email protected],order:2 \
--provider local --auto-approve true
# response includes per-signer tokens
sign request send --request-id <id> --provider local
# As the signer, with their token
sign signer list --signer-email [email protected]
sign signer fetch-document --request-id <id> --token alice-tok-... --out ./nda.pdf
# fetch-document surfaces `existingSignatures` so the signer can see what they're countersigning
sign sign --request-id <id> --token alice-tok-... \
--require-hash <sha256> --require-title "^Mutual NDA$" --require-signer-email [email protected]
# or
sign signer decline --request-id <id> --token alice-tok-... --reason "Terms changed"
Multi-signer: status only flips to completed when every signer is in signedBy[]. Pre-sign safety checks (--require-hash / --require-title / --require-signer-email) throw PRE_SIGN_*_MISMATCH before any state mutation.
Templates
Reuse a template defined in the provider dashboard (no PDF upload):
sign request from-template \
--template-id tmpl_abc --provider dropbox \
--signer role:Buyer,name:Alice,email:[email protected],order:1 \
--signer role:Seller,name:Bob,email:[email protected],order:2 \
--prefill name:purchase_price,value:1000 \
--auto-approve true
sign request send --request-id <id> --provider dropbox --test-mode true
Each --signer must include role:<roleName> matching a template role. --prefill name:K,value:V[,signer:N] populates template fields. Per-provider behavior: DocuSign uses per-signer text tabs; Dropbox uses custom_fields; SignWell uses placeholders.
Field placement
By default the hosted providers auto-append a generic signature page. For real contracts, pass --field (repeatable) on request create:
sign request create \
--title "NDA" --document ./contract.pdf \
--signer name:Alice,email:[email protected],order:1 \
--field signer:1,page:1,x:100,y:200,type:signature \
--field signer:1,page:1,x:100,y:240,type:date
Spec: signer:<order> (required), doc:<i> (multi-doc index), type:signature|initials|date|text|name|email, page:<n> x:<pt> y:<pt> (coordinate), or DocuSign-only anchor:"text" with optional x-offset / y-offset / anchor-units. The fields persist on the request and forward to the provider at send time.
Auto-detect signature field
For --provider local, sign sign --auto-place calls the detector and uses the top candidate iff there's a unique high-confidence (≥0.8) match.
# Inspect candidates first
sign pdf detect-signature-field --pdf ./contract.pdf
# Auto-place (errors loudly on ambiguity)
sign sign --request-id <id> --token <t> --name-signature "Alice" \
--auto-place first # or true | last | all | page:N | index:N
Adjustment strategies in priority order: underline-snap (0.95), below-anchor-probe (0.85, French/EU conventions), whitespace-probe (0.75), shrink-to-fit (0.50). Date anchors are detected separately via sign pdf detect-date-field. Full reference in docs/agent-guide.md §6.4a.
Bulk send
sign request bulk \
--csv ./signers.csv \
--document ./contract.pdf --provider dropbox \
--title "Q2 NDA for {{email}}" --test-mode true
Each row becomes its own request with autoApprove: true. Title template supports {{email}}, {{name}}, {{row}}. Exit code 3 if any row failed; JSON output lists per-row results.
Trust beyond the provider
# Inspect any signed PDF (ours, Adobe's, DocuSign's, …) — no DB lookup required
sign pdf inspect --pdf ./signed.pdf
# Inspect the embedded PKCS#7 of a request we sent
sign request verify-signed-pdf --request-id <id>
sign request verify-signed-pdf --request-id <id> --recipient [email protected] # single-signer view
# Anchor the audit head against a public RFC 3161 TSA
sign audit anchor --request-id <id>
# Bundle for archival
sign audit export --request-id <id> --out ./bundle/
audit verify walks the local hash chain. request verify-signed-pdf recomputes the SHA-256 over the /ByteRange, compares it to the messageDigest in the embedded PKCS#7, and verifies the PKCS#7 signature value against the signer certificate's public key (RSA/ECDSA) — so a forged or tampered signature fails, exit 3, not just a modified-after-signing one. sign pdf inspect works on any signed PDF (no request id required). audit anchor issues a TimeStamp token from a TSA. See docs/reference/audit-chain.md for the full model.
Profiles
sign profile init --name prod --provider signwell --db "~/.sign-cli/prod.db" --strict-provider true
sign profile set --name prod --key credentials.SIGNWELL_API_KEY --value "{{env:SIGNWELL_API_KEY}}"
sign --profile prod request show --request-id <id>
# Or implicitly via a project-level sign-profile.json (git/npm-style upward discovery)
Resolution order: flag > env > project profile > user profile > built-in default. Credentials redacted by default in profile show (--show-secrets true to reveal). Over the MCP HTTP transport, show_secrets is refused unless an --http-auth-token is configured (it stays available on stdio MCP and the CLI). See docs/reference/profiles.md.
Doctor
sign doctor # legacy env-report; always exits 0
sign doctor preflight # structured per-check report; exit 0 ok, 1 failed
sign doctor providers # capability matrix across all providers
sign doctor account-check --provider signwell # provider /me check
preflight runs env-health checks (runtime:node_version, storage:db_path) on every provider, then provider-scoped checks layer on top. Branch on checks[].name for agent self-recovery.
Security notes
- Never commit
.envor API keys. - Rotate keys if shared in chat/logs.
- Keep test mode on during development.
- For path-traversal guards, secret redaction, idempotency, and read-only mode, see docs/reference/security-controls.md.
- For what the chain proves vs. what it doesn't, see docs/reference/security-model.md.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
See also
- AGENTS.md — the agent quickstart (output contract, exit codes, discovery, failure recovery).
- docs/agent-guide.md — canonical agent reference (per-command schemas, side effects, idempotency).
- docs/setup/ — provider setup (Dropbox, DocuSign, SignWell, embedded).
- docs/recipes/ — task-oriented recipes (preflight, agent-loop-mcp, weekly anchor, auditor handoff, sign as Alice, EU NDA).
- docs/reference/ — concept deep-dives (audit chain, exit codes, profiles, security model, architecture, legal posture, comparison).
- TROUBLESHOOTING.md — error catalog.
- CHANGELOG.md — what landed and when.
- integrations/ — Claude Desktop config, langchain starter.
- deploy/ — Fly / Render / Railway configs for the hosted demo.
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