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FSV — website security scanner

FSV — website security scanner

Local
github.comSecurity5Updated today

About FSV — website security scanner

FSV is a website security scanner for authorized assessments, available as a CLI, dashboard, CI step, and MCP server. It checks issues such as DNS takeover risks, exposed secrets, and vulnerable dependencies, and correlates findings into attack paths with remediation guidance.

Key features

  1. 01Scans DNS, cloud storage, scripts, and site configuration
  2. 02Correlates findings into attack paths
  3. 03Generates remediation guidance and fix packs
  4. 04Provides persistent triage and scan comparisons
  5. 05Exports Markdown, JSON, HTML, SARIF, and CSV reports
  6. 06Supports CI baselines and authorization checks

Use cases

  1. 01Assess an owned website for security issues
  2. 02Review scan findings and prioritize linked attack paths
  3. 03Gate CI builds on new findings
  4. 04Give an AI assistant findings and remediation guidance through MCP

MCP support

FSV provides an MCP server with scan, quick-check, report, triage, comparison, and ownership-verification tools, plus a `security_review` prompt. MCP clients can use it to assess authorized targets and review results.

Configuration

Local server config is the same for every client. Copy it into your client’s MCP config file.

mcp.json · Universal config
{
"mcpServers": {
"twayst0-fsv": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"fsv"
]
}
}
}
Run commanduvx fsv

Local servers need a runtime on your machine (e.g. Node.js 18+). Config file locations differ by client; see your client’s docs.

Packages
pypifsv2.3.0

Tools

12

Saved tool list · updated today

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
crawlbooleanNo
depthintegerNo
targetstringYes
cookiesanyNo
headersanyNo
modulesanyNo
profilestringNo
max_urlsintegerNo
seed_urlsanyNo
authorizedbooleanYes
max_minutesintegerNo
use_ct_logsbooleanNo
exclude_pathsanyNo
allow_externalbooleanNo

Details

From the project README

FSV — finds what checklists miss. An animated radar sweep lights up a dangling CNAME, an orphaned bucket, an SPF include that no longer exists, an XSS leading to session theft and an exposed source map.

CI Python 3.11+ 32 modules MCP server detection only tests license: MIT

Web security scanner for the problems nobody is watching — dangling DNS & subdomain takeover, orphaned cloud buckets, compromised script CDNs, SPF includes that expired, debug mode left on, secrets in your JavaScript, end-of-life software, and the attack paths that turn small findings into a real compromise.
Runs as a CLI, a dashboard, an MCP server for AI agents, and a CI step.

MCP in 30 s · See it work · What it finds · Attack paths · Install · Usage · CI · FSV & ZAP · Limits · Docs · Contact

⚠ Authorized use only

FSV is a security assessment tool. Use it only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Scanning systems without permission is illegal in most jurisdictions. Every entry point (web, CLI, MCP, CI) requires you to confirm authorization, and a shared deployment can additionally require proof of control of the target before any payload is sent (docs/DEPLOYMENT.md).


Connect your AI assistant in 30 seconds

Point Claude, Cursor or VS Code at FSV and ask it to review your site. The assistant asks you to confirm authorization, runs a passive check, then a full scan, leads with attack paths and hands you paste-ready fixes.

pip install fsv
fsv mcp-config --client claude-code     # prints:  claude mcp add fsv -- /path/to/fsv-mcp
fsv mcp-config --client claude-desktop  # or cursor · vscode — prints the JSON to paste

No install at all: with uv, point any MCP client at uvx fsv mcp ({ "command": "uvx", "args": ["fsv", "mcp"] }). FSV is listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.twayst0/fsv.

Then, in the assistant: “Use the security_review prompt on https://my-shop.example — I own it.”

MCP tools & prompt
ToolPurpose
fsv_scanFull scan — profiles, scope, time-box, seed_urls; headers / cookies for an authenticated scan with a test account
fsv_quick_check / fsv_waf_checkPassive posture check / WAF-CDN detection
fsv_fixesPaste-ready nginx / apache / caddy / express / DNS remediation
fsv_get_reportmd · json · html · sarif · csv · fix-*
fsv_triageMark false positive / accepted / fixed (persists per host)
fsv_compare_scans · fsv_target_trendBefore/after a fix · risk over time
fsv_verify_ownershipProof of control (DNS TXT or HTTP file) for shared deployments
fsv_list_scans · fsv_scan_stats · fsv_list_modulesHistory · request stats · catalogue

Prompt security_review(target, server) — the guided, authorization-first workflow above. Scan results carry an attack_paths section so the agent leads with what matters. The server is tested end to end over stdio (tests/test_mcp_stdio.py).

See it work

Animated terminal replay: fsv scan against the demo site prints Risk F 100/100, three critical findings including a hard-coded Stripe key and an XSS attack path, an orphaned bucket, an exposed actuator endpoint, then `fsv fixes` prints nginx configuration.

That output is real — a scan of the deliberately vulnerable demo site that ships in this repo. Reproduce it in a minute:

python examples/demo_site.py &                 # http://127.0.0.1:8961 — loopback only, fake secrets
fsv scan http://127.0.0.1:8961 --authorize
fsv web                                        # open the same scan in the dashboard

The cloud_storage check asks Amazon S3 whether the demo's bucket exists — that one request goes to AWS (read-only). Skip it with --no-external.

What it finds that checklists miss

Plenty of tools tell you a header is missing. The incidents that actually hurt organisations — including very well-run ones — are quieter, and they live where nobody is looking.

Six detection cards: dangling DNS record, orphaned bucket used as a script source, SPF include of a domain that no longer exists, exposed source map with a masked key, end-of-life PHP and jQuery, and an XSS plus non-HttpOnly cookie attack path.

The problemHow FSV avoids crying wolfModule
🪝A DNS record outlived its project — anyone can claim the name and serve content from your domainasks for the CNAME explicitly (an A lookup hides dangling aliases), follows the chain, and never treats a resolver error as "dangling"takeover
🪣A page loads a script from a bucket that no longer exists — whoever creates it controls your pageone max-keys=1 request; objects are never fetched, nothing is createdcloud_storage
✉️SPF include: of an expired domain, SPF over the 10-lookup limit, a 512-bit DKIM keyskips all DNS checks (with an explanation) if the domain itself doesn't resolvedns_security
🗺️Source maps and hard-coded credentials shipped to every visitorcredentials are reported masked and are never testedjs_analysis
🧱jQuery 3.3.1 / AngularJS 1.x / Vue 2 and PHP 8.1 past end of supportdated tables — flagged the day support ends; version read from the URL without downloading third-party filesjs_libs · tech
⛓️XSS + a session cookie without HttpOnly = account takeoveronly chains whose every link was found on this scancorrelation

Details, and every false-positive guard: docs/DETECTIONS.md.

Attack paths

Real compromises are rarely one bug — they're two or three "medium" problems that line up. Scanners rate each in isolation, so the combination stays invisible until someone writes the incident report. FSV reads its own findings (sending nothing more) and, where a chain is actually present, adds a finding that names the links, tells the story step by step, and states the cheapest single fix that breaks it. If a link is triaged away, the chain steps aside automatically.

Animated chain: reflected XSS reads a session cookie that lacks HttpOnly, leading to account takeover. A '+HttpOnly' badge lands on the second link and the chain turns green: chain broken.

ChainWhy it is worse together
XSS + session cookie without HttpOnlyone crafted link = account takeover
no HSTS / no HTTPS + session cookie without Securesession readable on any hostile network
takeover-able subdomain + session cookie scoped to the parent domainwhoever claims the subdomain receives your users' sessions
dangling SPF include + DMARC not enforcingperfectly authenticated phishing as your domain
no SPF/DMARC enforcement at allyour domain can be spoofed

Dashboard

The FSV dashboard after scanning the demo site: risk grade F, 100/100, counts per severity, and an Attack paths panel explaining two chains step by step with a 'Break the chain' recommendation for each.

The OWASP Top 10 breakdown and the findings list with the Stripe key finding expanded: description, masked evidence, remediation and references.

Liquid-glass UI with live progress (survives a page reload), the attack-path panel, OWASP breakdown, per-host risk trend, inline triage, module picker, scan comparison, and one-click export — reports or paste-ready fixes.

Features

  • Finds the pages first — besides links: robots.txt, sitemaps, routes leaked by debug pages, and API paths quoted in your JavaScript; action-like paths are never requested. --seed for anything else.
  • A badge for your README — fsv badge <scan_id> writes a dated grade badge (FSV security | A · 2026-10-25); regenerate it from CI.
  • Fix packs — turn findings into nginx / Apache / Caddy / Express / DNS configuration (fsv fixes <scan> nginx). Only what was actually found; CSP is emitted report-only.
  • CI-ready — fsv.toml, baselines (gate only on new findings), --fail-on, SARIF for GitHub code scanning, and a ready-made GitHub Action.
  • Triage that sticks — false positive / accepted risk / fixed / confirmed, stored per host by stable fingerprint, re-applied to later scans, excluded from the score. Diff any two scans; per-host trend.
  • Evidence over guesses — exposure checks validate content (a .git/HEAD must look like one; an SPA that answers 200 to everything produces nothing). Every finding has a confidence, a CWE, an OWASP Top 10 (2021) category, impact and remediation.
  • Honest failure — a crashing module is counted, explained and logged; a target that never answered is flagged, not graded "clean".
  • Safe by construction — secrets masked at the source; cloud-metadata/link-local never reachable, loopback/RFC 1918 optionally blocked, on every lookup and redirect hop; dashboard CSRF/DNS-rebinding guard and token auth.
  • Extensible — a module is one class; drop a file in ~/.fsv/plugins or ship an entry-point package (docs/WRITING_MODULES.md). Bring your own JS-library advisories and EOL dates.
  • Fast & polite, hard to stall — async engine, shared HTTP client with cache, request coalescing, token-bucket rate limit, retries, size cap, time limit with partial results. A hanging endpoint costs one timeout per scan, not one per module; every response regex is linear-time. Tested against hostile local servers (redirect loops, 20 MB bodies, hangs, catch-all SPAs).
  • Five report formats — Markdown (OWASP-grouped), JSON, self-contained HTML, SARIF 2.1, CSV.
  • Local-first — results in a local SQLite file; the only optional third-party calls are listed in DEPLOYMENT.md.

Install

pip install fsv          # Python 3.11+  ·  pipx install fsv  keeps it isolated
fsv doctor               # checks Python, dependencies, DNS, database, plugins

From source: git clone https://github.com/twayst0/fsv && cd fsv && ./install.sh (or pip install -e .).

Requires Python 3.11+. Docker: see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md (docker compose up).

Usage

fsv scan example.com --authorize                       # full scan of a site you own
fsv scan example.com --authorize --profile passive     # read-only: no payloads sent
fsv web                                                # dashboard → http://127.0.0.1:7474
CLI reference
# scope & tuning
fsv scan example.com --authorize --exclude "/admin/*,/logout" --max-urls 100 --max-time 900 --tag prod
fsv scan example.com --authorize --header "Authorization: Bearer X" --cookie "session=abc"    # authenticated
fsv scan example.com --authorize --ct-logs        # also ask Certificate Transparency (crt.sh) for subdomains*
fsv scan example.com --authorize --no-external    # skip modules that contact hosts other than the target
fsv scan example.com --authorize --proxy env      # behind a corporate proxy (HTTPS_PROXY); or --proxy http://host:3128

# reports & fixes
fsv scan example.com --authorize -o report.html   # .md .json .html .sarif .csv
fsv report <scan_id> --format fix-nginx           # or fix-apache fix-caddy fix-express fix-dns
fsv fixes  <scan_id> nginx -o nginx-fixes.md

# triage, history, diff
fsv findings <scan_id>
fsv triage <scan_id> <finding_id> false_positive --note "test endpoint"
fsv list --target example.com   ·   fsv diff <before_id> <after_id>   ·   fsv prune --keep 50

# ownership proof (for shared deployments)           # * sends the domain name to crt.sh
fsv verify example.com   ·   fsv verify example.com --check

fsv modules   ·   fsv doctor
In CI
# fsv.toml  (commit it; ${VAR} is read from the environment — never commit secrets)
[scan]
profile  = "balanced"
max_urls = 100
exclude  = ["/admin/*"]
max_time = 900
fail_on  = "high"
baseline = ".fsv-baseline.json"
[scan.headers]
Authorization = "Bearer ${FSV_API_TOKEN}"
fsv scan staging.example.com --authorize --write-baseline .fsv-baseline.json    # once: accept today's state
fsv scan staging.example.com --authorize                                         # every build: fails only on NEW high+ findings
# .github/workflows/security.yml
- uses: twayst0/[email protected]          # pin a release tag (or a commit SHA)
  with:
    target: https://staging.example.com
    authorized: "true"          # you confirm you may test this target
    profile: balanced
    fail-on: high
    baseline: .fsv-baseline.json

SARIF is uploaded to GitHub code scanning; the HTML report and log are attached as an artifact.

FSV and OWASP ZAP

ZAP is the right tool for deep testing of an application's inputs — use it. FSV looks at what surrounds the application, where typical DAST scans don't go, and the two work well side by side:

AreaTypical DAST scanFSV
DNS that outlived its project (dangling CNAME, unregistered targets)out of scopetakeover
Buckets your pages load from that no longer existout of scopecloud_storage
Scripts from compromised CDNs (polyfill.io 2024) or expired domainsout of scopesupply_chain
Email spoofing: SPF lookup limit, dead includes, DMARC, DKIM key sizeout of scopedns_security
Debug mode visible only on error pages (Django, Werkzeug, Ignition…)partlysupply_chain
debug_mode
Several medium findings that add up to account takeoverlisted separatelycorrelation attack paths
Fixes as server config, triage that persists, CI baselines, MCP—built in
Deep input fuzzing, authenticated spidering, scripted auth, JS-rendered appsyesbasic

Modules (32)

FSV ships 32 modules — 26 passive, 6 active. Run fsv modules for the live list.

The full catalogue  (or run fsv modules)
ModuleLooks forKind
takeoverdangling CNAME / unclaimed SaaS resource / unregistered target domainpassive · site · ↗
cloud_storageorphaned or publicly-listable S3 / GCS / Azure buckets referenced by the sitepassive · url · ↗
dns_securitySPF (10-lookup limit, dead includes, +all), DMARC, DKIM key strength, MTA-STS, dead NS/MX, CAA, DNSSECpassive · site
js_analysishard-coded credentials, exposed source maps, internal/non-prod hosts in client codepassive · url
js_libsknown-vulnerable & end-of-life JavaScript librariespassive · url
supply_chainscripts/styles from compromised or abandoned CDNs (polyfill.io, bootcdn, staticfile, rawgit) or from domains that are no longer registeredpassive · url · ↗
debug_modeframework debug mode in production (Django DEBUG=True, Werkzeug console, Rails, Laravel Ignition, Symfony, Express, ASP.NET) — seen on error pages a crawler never visitspassive · site
paths~100 exposed files/endpoints, each content-validated (.git, .env, actuator, pprof, tfstate, backups…)passive · site
techstack fingerprint + end-of-life software from a dated tablepassive · site
headers · csp_analyzersecurity headers · deep CSP reviewpassive
sslHTTPS, certificate validity, weak protocols/cipherspassive · site
cookiesSecure / HttpOnly / SameSite / parent-domain scopepassive
sri · mixed_content · clickjacking · form_security · csrfpage-level hygienepassive
info_disclosure · dir_listing · http_methods · security_txt · waf_detect · graphql_introspection · jwt_analysis · subdomainexposure & reconpassive
xss · sqli · ssti · open_redirect · cors · host_header_injectionreflected/error-based/marker checks (benign payloads)active

↗ contacts hosts other than the target (skip with --no-external). passive = sends no crafted payloads. Profiles: passive (only passive modules), balanced (default), aggressive (higher rate/concurrency).

How it works

Pipeline: crawl, 32 modules, aggregate by fingerprint, correlate into attack paths, triage per host, report — shared by CLI, dashboard, MCP agents and the GitHub Action.

One engine, four front doors. Address policy and proof of control live in the engine, so every front door gets them; request guard and token auth belong to the web server. See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Configuration (environment variables)
VariableDefaultPurpose
FSV_HOST / FSV_PORT127.0.0.1 / 7474dashboard bind address
FSV_DB~/.fsv/scans.dbSQLite database
FSV_TOKEN—shared secret required on every API / WebSocket call (X-FSV-Token or ?token=)
FSV_ALLOWED_HOSTS—extra Host names the dashboard answers to (DNS-rebinding guard)
FSV_BLOCK_PRIVATEoffrefuse loopback / RFC 1918 targets (SSRF protection). Cloud-metadata ranges are always refused
FSV_REQUIRE_VERIFICATIONoffpayload-sending scans only against hosts whose owner proved control
FSV_MAX_SCANS3concurrent scans
FSV_DISABLED_MODULES—comma-separated module names to turn off
FSV_PLUGIN_DIR / FSV_NO_PLUGINS~/.fsv/plugins / offplugin discovery
FSV_ADVISORY_FILE / FSV_EOL_FILE—your own JS-library advisories / end-of-life dates (JSON)

Limits — what FSV is not

  • It reads HTML; it does not execute JavaScript, so content that only exists after client-side rendering isn't discovered.
  • Active checks cover common reflected classes with benign markers. It is not a replacement for a penetration test, SAST or an SCA pipeline.
  • The JS-advisory and end-of-life tables are curated snapshots — cross-check with OSV / endoflife.date for anything important, and extend them with the files above.
  • DNS checks are only as good as the resolver (fsv doctor tests it). A resolver that can't answer produces no DNS findings, not bad ones.
  • Findings carry a confidence; tentative ones are hints. Triage them, and tell us about false positives — they're the most useful bug reports.

Documentation

Detections · Architecture · Writing modules · Deploying safely · Security policy · Contributing · Changelog

The animated SVGs and screenshots above are generated from a real scan: scripts/build_readme_assets.sh --screenshots.

Contact

twayst0 (tways) — author and maintainer

Questions, collaboration and licensing enquiries are welcome by email or Discord.

License

MIT — free to use, modify and share, for anyone, including commercially. Keep the copyright and licence notice. Copyright © 2026 twayst0. See LICENSE.

Disclaimer

This software is provided "as is", for lawful, authorized security testing only. The authors accept no liability for misuse or damage. Always obtain written permission before testing any system you do not own.

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