A
active-directory-attack-paths
About active-directory-attack-paths
A skill for identifying Active Directory misconfigurations and privilege-escalation paths during authorized internal assessments. It covers enumeration, credential attacks, delegation and ACL abuse, with guidance on evidence capture and cleanup.
Key features
- 01Enumerate trusts, groups, and account settings
- 02Assess Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting
- 03Check delegation and ACL escalation paths
- 04Record commands, outputs, and affected accounts
- 05Clean up assessment changes and tools
Use cases
- 01Assess an authorized internal network foothold
- 02Trace paths to Domain Admin privileges
- 03Verify delegation or ACL risks
Install
Copy the command and run it in a terminal.
$
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ securityskills/ skills --skill active-directory-attack-pathsAfter installing, type/active-directory-attack-pathsin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.
Details
From the project READMEActive Directory Attack Paths
Identify and demonstrate Active Directory misconfigurations during authorized internal assessments.
When to Use
- You have a foothold (or credentials) inside an authorized internal network
- You need to map privilege-escalation paths to Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin
Methodology
1. Initial Enumeration
whoami /all, domain trusts, nested groups- BloodHound / SharpHound collection (small collection first:
--collectionmethod All --exclude-dcif stealth matters) - Look for: Kerberoastable SPNs, AS-REP roastable accounts (no preauth), unconstrained delegation, DCSync rights, GPO abuse
2. Credential Attacks
- Kerberoasting: request TGS for SPN accounts, crack offline (
hashcat -m 13100) - AS-REP Roasting: accounts with
DONT_REQ_PREAUTH, crack offline (hashcat -m 18200) - Password spraying only within RoE — respect lockout policies
3. Delegation Abuse
- Unconstrained delegation: capture TGTs via printer bug (SpoolSample) with Rubeus
- Constrained delegation: S4U2Proxy abuse to impersonate users
- Resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD): requires write rights over
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
4. ACL Attacks
- GenericAll / GenericWrite / WriteDacl / WriteOwner on users, groups, or GPOs
- Force a password reset or ACL change, then re-run collection to confirm the new path
5. Domain Dominance
- DCSync (
mimikatz lsadump::dcsyncor secretsdump.py) — only with explicit authorization - AD CS abuse: ESC1–ESC8 templates (Certipy), Golden/Silver certificates
Evidence to Capture
For each step: the command run, the output showing the escalation, and the accounts affected.
Cleanup
Remove created accounts, changed ACLs, and dropped tools; note every modification in the cleanup log.
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