About commerce-trust-safety
A skill specifying trust and safety rules for shopping and merchant agents, including untrusted-content fencing, provenance checks, operation limits, and memory handling. It is suited to implementing or reviewing safety boundaries in shared executors and related MCP servers.
Key features
- 01Normalize and fence third-party content
- 02Gate writes by data provenance
- 03Ground questions about figures and terms
- 04Bind session identity and verify ownership
- 05Limit and delete stored memory
Use cases
- 01Reduce prompt injection from catalog or web content
- 02Validate cart and merchant change operations
- 03Review memory validation and retention rules
- 04Restrict MCP servers to local interfaces
MCP support
The README says reference MCP servers bind to loopback unless an environment variable indicates an authenticating gateway. Servers obtain the principal from their environment.
Install
Copy the command and run it in a terminal.
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ anthropics/ commerce-agents --skill commerce-trust-safetyAfter installing, type/commerce-trust-safetyin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.
Details
From the project READMETrust and safety rules
commerce_common/ is commerce-common/commerce_common/, shopping_agent/ is shopping-agent/core/shopping_agent/, and
merchant_agent/ is merchant-agent/core/merchant_agent/; docs/safety.md lists the same rules. A rule inside a tool
call holds on all three paths, which share one executor (commerce-architecture); rules 10 and 15 name the paths they run
on. Merchant staging, guardrails, approval, and marketplace posture are in commerce-merchant-operations.
Fence third-party content
- Every tool result from catalog, review, policy, order, metric, message, or web content goes through
Fence.fence_payload(commerce_common/fencing.py): NFKC-normalized, invisible and control characters removed, fence markers, forged turn markers, and special tokens replaced, wrapped in the role's label, and cut atmax_fenced_chars. The executor's_fencedapplies it to every handler. - The label and the notice are per-role constants (
STOREFRONT_FENCEinshopping_agent/fencing.py,MERCHANT_FENCEinmerchant_agent/fencing.py); the notice appears once, in the static prompt, with nothing untrusted in it. - The per-request block (profile, cart, memory facts, page, store context) sits inside the same fence after the cache
breakpoint (
build_dynamic_contextin each role'sprompt.py); backend context blocks have their own cap. - A model-supplied result count is clamped to
max_search_results(clamp_limitincommerce_common/execution.py).
Gate writes on provenance and caps
- A cart write accepts only ids in
ShoppingSessionState.seen_products, filled by the session's catalog and order reads (check_provenanceandremember_order_itemsinshopping_agent/gates.py); update and remove also accept a line already in the cart. Merchant staging accepts only ids inseen_listingsandread_listings, apply and discard only ids inseen_changes(merchant_agent/gates.py; commerce-merchant-operations). max_quantity_per_itemcaps the line after the write andmax_cart_linesthe cart, under a session lock (gated_add_to_cartinshopping_agent/gates.py; caps inshopping_agent/config.py). The lock is per process, soStorefrontBackendcart methods enforce them too; eligibility, pricing, and inventory are the backend's in both roles.- Nothing in either interface charges or places an order:
checkoutrenders the cart (enrich_checkoutinshopping_agent/enrichment.py) and the host completes it; post-purchase care is reads, with no cancel or refund tool. - Provenance lives on the session state (
ShoppingSessionState,MerchantSessionState), saved with the session when the request or turn ends (SessionStoreinexamples/demo_common/sessions.py, a versioned state document beside the transcript), so a request on another process loads it. Each map keeps its newestPROVENANCE_CAPrecords (rememberincommerce_common/types.py); a dropped id needs a fresh read. - A component is validated, its products, orders, metrics, or changes are joined from those records, and ids without
provenance are dropped and reported (
run_presentationincommerce_common/presentation.py; each role'senrichment.py; commerce-ui-tools).
Ground the answers that are figures or terms
- A terms question, an order question, or an unseen product id (
GROUNDING_RULESinshopping_agent/grounding.py), or a performance question or an apply request with nothing staged (merchant_agent/grounding.py), starts from the matching read:first_forced_toolincommerce_common/grounding.pypicks it, the Messages API runtimes force it withtool_choice, and the SDK runtimes prefetch it when the rule has a prefetch form (groundincommerce_common/agent_sdk.py; the terms rule has none); the hosted path has the prompt only. - The lexicons are config tuples (
policy_intent_terms,order_intent_terms,product_id_patterns,metrics_intent_terms, and their cues); a deployment appends its own words, a gate flag turns a rule off, and neither changes prompt bytes.
Hold identity on the server
- Session start binds the authenticated principal to an unguessable session id; later requests carry only that id, and
routes read the principal from the record (
SessionStore.startandsession_dependencyinexamples/demo_common/sessions.py). No request field or tool argument names a user, merchant, or operator; the MCP servers take the principal from their environment, a production server from its request. - Whether the principal owns a record (order, ticket, listing), and whether the step a call depends on has happened, is the backend's check against its store; an id having provenance does not make it theirs or ready.
Bound what is remembered
- Every fact on both write paths (
save_memoryand post-turn extraction) passesvalidate_factincommerce_common/memory.py: key of at most 64 characters, value of at most 200, one of the threeMemoryCategoryvalues, and theMemoryWriteFilter, which refuses identifier-shaped values by default;memory_blocked_patternsadds patterns, and a filter withchecksreplaces it (MemoryRuntime.build). - Extraction reads the last exchange's user and assistant text (
transcript_textincommerce_common/turn.py), andextract_and_storedrops its batch when the subject was purged meanwhile; the Messages API runtimes run it (update_memory), the SDK host calls the runtime, and the hosted path writes throughsave_memoryonly. memory_retention_days(with_retention),MemoryStore.delete_fact,MemoryStore.clear, andenable_memoryhold on every path without changing prompt or tool bytes; the examples expose read and delete routes (install_memory_routesinexamples/demo_common/memory.py), andclearbelongs in account deletion.- The subject is the shopper's
user_idor the operation'smerchant_id(memory_subjectin each role'sexecutor.py).
Refuse in the result, and keep the surface fixed
- A held call returns a normal result naming its gate (
ToolOutcome.heldincommerce_common/streaming.py; the host'stool_resultevent carriesstatus: blocked), a failure returns an error result, andexecutenever raises. - The tool list is a function of the config:
enable_web_search(default off) adds the tool, the SDK runtimes allow-list the registered names, and the manifests enable tools one by one. - The reference MCP servers bind to loopback unless an environment variable states that an authenticating gateway is in
front (
enforce_local_only_bindincommerce_common/mcp_server.py).
Two rules for adversarial evals
- Poisoned listings, reviews, and messages live in eval fixtures merged in for a run, outside demo and catalog data.
- Every refusal case has a should-serve counterpart in the same niche, so a suite catches over-refusal too (commerce-evals).