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detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

github.com/mukul975Security35.2k56 installsUpdated 8w ago
Repository

About detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

A detection guide for analysts investigating DLL sideloading during threat hunts and incident response. It combines load events, signatures, paths, hashes, and process behavior to assess suspicious DLLs loaded by legitimate applications.

Key features

  1. 01Identify potentially vulnerable applications
  2. 02Review Sysmon DLL load events
  3. 03Verify DLL signatures and paths
  4. 04Compare file hashes
  5. 05Correlate host process behavior

Use cases

  1. 01Investigate EDR alerts for unsigned DLLs
  2. 02Check legitimate-app wrappers and unusual paths
  3. 03Respond to DLL sideloading incidents
  4. 04Hunt software targeted by threat intelligence

Install

Copy the command and run it in a terminal.

$npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

After installing, type/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacksin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.

Bundled files

References and scripts installed along with SKILL.md.

LICENSE
assets/
template.md
references/
api-reference.md
standards.md
workflows.md
scripts/
agent.py
process.py

Details

From the project README

Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks

When to Use

  • When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments
  • After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications
  • When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers
  • During incident response to identify trojanized applications
  • When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software

Prerequisites

  • EDR with DLL load monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
  • Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with hash verification
  • Application whitelisting or DLL integrity monitoring
  • Software inventory of legitimate applications and expected DLL paths
  • Code signing verification capabilities

Workflow

  1. Identify Sideloading Targets: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).
  2. Monitor DLL Load Events: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.
  3. Check DLL Signatures: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.
  4. Detect Path Anomalies: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.
  5. Hash Verification: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.
  6. Correlate with Process Behavior: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.
  7. Document and Remediate: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.

Key Concepts

ConceptDescription
T1574.002DLL Side-Loading
T1574.001DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1574.006Dynamic Linker Hijacking
T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
DLL Search OrderWindows DLL loading priority path
Side-LoadingPlacing malicious DLL where legitimate app loads it
Phantom DLLDLL that legitimate apps try to load but does not exist
DLL ProxyingMalicious DLL forwarding calls to legitimate DLL

Tools & Systems

ToolPurpose
SysmonEvent ID 7 DLL load monitoring
CrowdStrike FalconDLL load detection with process context
Microsoft Defender for EndpointDLL load anomaly detection
Process MonitorReal-time DLL load tracing
DLL Export ViewerVerify DLL export functions
SigcheckDigital signature verification
pe-sievePE analysis for proxied DLLs

Common Scenarios

  1. Legitimate App Wrapper: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.
  2. Phantom DLL Exploitation: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.
  3. DLL Proxy Loading: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.
  4. Software Update Hijack: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-SIDELOAD-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1574.002
Host Application: [Legitimate signed executable]
Sideloaded DLL: [Malicious DLL name and path]
Expected DLL Path: [Where DLL should legitimately be]
DLL Signed: [Yes/No]
App Location: [Expected/Anomalous]
Host: [Hostname]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

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