About docker-sandboxes-kits
docker-sandboxes-kits is an agent skill for authoring, validating, and distributing Docker Sandboxes kit specifications. It is for users composing complete sandbox agents or mixins, with guidance spanning schema rules, arguments, setup, and artifact signing.
Key features
- 01Author sandbox and mixin kit specs
- 02Validate strict spec.yaml schemas
- 03Parameterize kits with declared arguments
- 04Compose kits with extends and mixins
- 05Pack and distribute kit artifacts
- 06Sign and verify kit provenance
Use cases
- 01Create a complete agent or extension kit
- 02Debug schema or argument-substitution errors
- 03Publish or retrieve kits from an OCI registry
- 04Verify artifact signatures and provenance
Install
Copy the command and run it in a terminal.
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ docker/ skills --skill docker-sandboxes-kitsAfter installing, type/docker-sandboxes-kitsin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.
Bundled files
References and scripts installed along with SKILL.md.
skill.yamlagents/openai.yamlassets/spec-mixin.yamlspec-sandbox.yamlchecks/verification.mdreferences/kit-distribution-commands.mdsources.mdspec-v2-fields.mdDetails
From the project READMEDocker Sandboxes: Kits (spec.yaml)
Overview
A kit is a directory (or ZIP/OCI/git artifact) containing a spec.yaml
plus an optional files/ tree. sbx composes a kit into a running or
about-to-be-created sandbox at sbx create/sbx run --kit/sbx env time or
at sbx kit add time. This skill owns kit-spec v2 authoring, validation, and
distribution — everything under spec.yaml's own grammar — and defers what a
kit's declarations mean at runtime (credential injection, network
enforcement) to docker-sandboxes-network-credentials, and the sandboxes a
kit is composed into to docker-sandboxes-lifecycle.
When to use this skill
Activate this skill when:
- The user wants to write, validate, or pack a
spec.yamlfor akind: sandbox(complete agent) orkind: mixin(extension) kit. - The user wants a mixin to add a tool, credential, network allowance, or files to an existing built-in agent.
- The user wants to publish a kit to (or pull one from) an OCI registry, sign it, or verify a signature/provenance attestation.
- The user is debugging a kit-validation error, an argument-substitution
error, or
sbx kit add's recreate-aware requirement.
Do not use this skill when
Do not use this skill when:
- The task is creating/running/removing the sandbox a kit is composed into,
independent of the kit's own content — use
docker-sandboxes-lifecycle. - The task is what a credential or network rule a kit declares actually
does at runtime (proxy injection, allow/deny precedence, or what the
CURRENT network/global policy already permits), or is about secrets/
policy that have nothing to do with a kit — use
docker-sandboxes-network-credentials. - The task is the
sbxenv.yamlfile format that references kits via its ownkits:block — usedocker-sandboxes-envfor that file's schema (this skill still owns what goes inside the referenced kit itself).
Core guidance
kind: sandbox vs kind: mixin — pick the right one
- Exactly one
kind: sandboxkit composes into any sandbox (a complete agent: base image + launch config). Any number ofkind: mixinkits layer onto it (tools, credentials, network, files). A mixin must not declare asandbox:block,extends:, ormixins:. - Every kit needs
schemaVersion: "2"(the current clean grammar — no legacy shims),kind, andnamematching^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,62}[a-z0-9])?$. Decoding is strict: any unrecognized field anywhere is a hard error (e.g. a typo likepermissions.netwrok:), so a kit that validates has no silent typos.schemaVersion: "2" kind: mixin name: extra-egress - Do not redefine a base agent's credential in a mixin: declaring a new
apiKey.nameorproxyManagedfor the same service fails composition.shell,docker-agent, andopencodealready owngithub. An additive routing-only entry (apiKey.inject, no name/proxyManaged/oauth, andrequired: false) can extend the base credential instead. OAuth belongs on sandbox kits, never mixins. Seereferences/spec-v2-fields.md. Inspect built-in definitions atsandboxlib/agentkits/agents/<agent>/spec.yamlin the pinned source;sbx kit inspecttakes artifact references, not built-in names. Standalone mixin validation does not test composition.
The sandbox: block (sandbox kits only)
- Required for
kind: sandbox(unless the kitextends:a parent that already supplies it); forbidden forkind: mixin. image:is the pre-built base image.entrypoint:is the fixed process prefix (entrypoint[0]is the binary);command:is the mode-specific argument tail — either a bare list (setsdefault,interactivefalls back to it) or{default: [...], interactive: [...]}. For a complete minimal kit, useassets/spec-sandbox.yaml, which inherits the embedded shell definition rather than inventing an image or command.sandbox.build:(Dockerfile build) is accepted but not built by the runtime this release — a kit that setsbuild:must still setimage:, or it is rejected at load with an actionable error.extends:(below) is the simplest way to get a real, working image without inventing one. A sandbox kit that extends a built-in agent (e.g.extends: shell) inherits that agent's realsandbox.imageand may omitsandbox:entirely — see the minimal example asset, which does exactly this rather than naming a made-up image reference.
Egress: permissions.network — and the all-egress-declared rule
permissions.network.allow/denyare the v2 home for what v1 spelled as top-levelnetwork:. Enforced shapes include exact host, exact host+port, single-label wildcards (*.example.com), multi-label wildcards (**.example.com), and CIDR prefixes. Port ranges are not supported by the runtime matcher; use separate exact ports. Deny wins within domain rules or within CIDR rules. A decisive domain decision is evaluated before CIDR rules: an allowed hostname is not checked against a CIDR deny for its resolved IP. Do not rely on a CIDR deny alone to block an already-allowed hostname.permissions: network: allow: - registry.npmjs.org deny: - telemetry.example.compermissions.network.allowis additive across a composition, and a kit's own allow list is not the only thing granting a sandbox egress. The sandbox already carries the base agent's own allow list, plus whatever the global or per-sandbox network policy (sbx policy, independently of any kit) permits — seedocker-sandboxes-network- credentials. Removing a host from one kit'sallowlist does not by itself prove that host is blocked — the global policy defaults (balancedallows common package registries and AI services;allow-allallows everything) or another composed kit may still permit it. Never claim a host is blocked without checking the actual effective decision withsbx policy check network --sandbox <name> <host>on a real sandbox.- Declare the egress a kit requires explicitly for reproducibility. Credential injection does not itself grant network access. Omitting an allow entry leaves reachability dependent on the existing global/per-sandbox policy; it does not necessarily block the host. Check the effective decision.
credentials — what the kit needs, never how the user stores it
- Each entry declares a
serviceidentity and where to inject the resolved value (apiKeyand/oroauth); it never declares how the user obtains or stores the credential — that lives in the user's own bindings file, wired throughsbx secret set(seedocker-sandboxes-network-credentials). apiKey.inject[]needs adomainand either an explicitheader+format(formatmust contain exactly one%s) or thescheme:sugar:scheme: bearerexpands toAuthorization: Bearer %s(nousername),scheme: basicrequiresusernameand is mutually exclusive withformat. Pick aservicename no composed base agent already declares (see the duplicate-service rule above) — seereferences/spec-v2-fields.mdfor a complete fragment.apiKey.proxyManaged: truesets the in-container env var to the literalproxy-managedsentinel rather than leaving it unset; the real value is substituted only by the proxy, on the allow-listed inject domains.oauthneedstokenEndpoint.host/.pathand, unlesspassthrough: true, non-emptysentinels.accessToken/.refreshToken.passthrough: trueis a security downgrade — the real token reaches the container instead of a sentinel — use it only when the kit's own design requires it and say so indescription.
setup — install (once) vs. startup (every start) vs. files (startup-time writes)
| Block | Command shape | Runs |
|---|---|---|
setup.install[].command | string, via sh -c | Once, synchronously, before the agent first launches. Runs for every kit, built-in or not. |
setup.startup[].command | list, exec-style (no shell) | On every container start (create, stop/start, daemon restart, host reboot) — must be idempotent. |
setup.files[] | file write via shell exec | At container startup; path absolute; only ${WORKDIR} placeholder allowed in content. |
Optional fragment for the shell kit in assets/spec-sandbox.yaml:
setup:
startup:
- command: ["sh", "-c", "mkdir -p ~/.my-kit"]
files:
- path: /home/agent/.my-kit/config.json
content: '{"workdir": "${WORKDIR}"}'
setup.filesis not the same mechanism as thefiles/directory tree (below).setup.filesentries are dynamic,${WORKDIR}- substituted writes performed at startup time; thefiles/home/andfiles/workspace/directory tree is a set of static files packed alongsidespec.yamland copied in at container-create time, and it is specifically thefiles/workspace/half of that tree — notsetup.files— that is written after the workspace is populated (e.g. after an in-containergit cloneunder--clone). Do not conflate the two:setup.fileshas no "after workspace population" timing guarantee of its own.- All three
setup:lists concatenate in--kitorder across composed kits. - Default execution users: install as root (
user: "0") unless overridden; startup/entrypoint as the agent user (uid1000) unless overridden. Root install steps writing under/home/agentmustchownit back toagent:agent, or later agent-user writes there fail.
volumes — creation-time only, every volume must set a size
- Each entry needs an absolute
path:, optionaltype: tmpfs(RAM-backed; omit/""for the default block-backed volume), optionalsize:(byte-size string) andmode:(octal). - Volumes apply only at sandbox-create time —
sbx kit add(runtime injection) skips volume changes entirely; a kit that needs one must be present at creation. - Always set
size:on a block volume. An unsized volume inherits a 50 GiB default and costs real host disk immediately (ext4 inode-table zeroing); 512 MiB is the practical floor — below itmke2fsswitches inode density and the space savings mostly disappear.
args — parameterizing a kit
- Declare under top-level
args:(v2 only — the frozen v1 grammar has noargsblock), each with exactly one ofdefault/required: true, plus optionaldescription/enum/pattern. Reference with${{ kit.args.NAME }}anywhere inspec.yamlorfiles/; substitution happens before the spec is decoded. Every reference must be declared, or loading fails — that is what makes the block a trustworthy list of a kit's inputs. Quote a placeholder used in a string field (VERSION: "${{ kit.args.version }}"), or an unquoted numeric-looking value decodes as a number and fails to decode into a string field. - Supply values with
--kit-arg name=value(every kit) or--kit-arg kitname.name=value(one kit only), or--kit-args-file. Never pass a secret this way —--kit-argvalues are not masked; seedocker-sandboxes-network-credentials.
extends and mixins — composition, not runtime injection
extends:resolves only built-in agent names at this pinned release (shell,claude, etc.). Remote git/OCI parents fail to resolve, even if pinned; the broader format specification is not an implementation guarantee. The minimal asset uses the supportedextends: shell.mixins:is accepted with a warning but is not applied by this runtime. Use--kitorsbx kit addfor composition. The format's immutable-ref requirements do not make unimplemented remote inheritance work.- Prefer digest/commit-pinned CLI kit references for reproducibility.
--kitandsbx kit addstill accept mutable tags/branches; the CLI parser does not enforce this recommendation. requires.agent(mixin-only; rejected onkind: sandbox) pins the single base agent a mixin is designed for (e.g. Claude-specific env vars). It is well-formedness-checked by the spec library; the actual agent-affinity mismatch is enforced by the composition consumer, not bysbx kit validatealone.
Validating, packaging, and distributing
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
sbx kit validate REFERENCE [--kit-arg ...] | Local directory, ZIP, or git reference; OCI is rejected. Schema-only well-formedness check. Never composes against a base agent — cannot catch a duplicate-service credential collision or confirm any domain is reachable at runtime. |
sbx kit inspect REFERENCE [--kit-arg ...] [--json] | Loads and prints the decoded artifact before composing it, including --kit-arg substitution preview. |
sbx kit pack DIRECTORY [-o OUTPUT.zip] | Packages a validated directory as a ZIP. |
sbx kit pull REFERENCE [-o OUTPUT] | Pulls a kit's raw layer payload from an OCI registry without composing it. |
sbx kit push DIRECTORY REGISTRY/REPO:TAG [--sign] | Packages and pushes; every push attaches an unsigned-by-default SLSA provenance attestation. |
sbx kit provenance REFERENCE [--certificate-identity ...] | Prints the attestation push attached; marked UNSIGNED unless verified against a matching key/identity. |
sbx kit sign REFERENCE / sbx kit verify REFERENCE | Sigstore sign/verify (keyless by default); prefer --identity-token-file over --identity-token. |
sbx kit add SANDBOX REFERENCE [--kit-arg ...] | Injects a mixin only into an existing sandbox at runtime (recreate-aware label required); container-immutable settings (security.privileged, volumes:) cannot take effect this way. |
See references/kit-distribution-commands.md for full flag lists and
worked examples of each command above.
Related skills
- For the sandboxes a kit is composed into (
sbx create/run --kit,sbx kit add SANDBOX), usedocker-sandboxes-lifecycle. - For what a kit's
credentials:/permissions.network:declarations mean at runtime — proxy injection, allow/deny precedence, the effective policy a sandbox actually has once global/per-sandbox policy is included, where the user stores the actual secret value — usedocker-sandboxes-network-credentials. - For the
sbxenv.yamlfile whosekits:/agent:fields reference a kit by this schema, usedocker-sandboxes-env.
References
references/sources.md— provenance for every rule above (spec package, SPEC-v2.md, help captures, docs URLs).references/spec-v2-fields.md— the complete v2 field table (common fields, sandbox-only fields, mixin-only fields, shared blocks) for lookup without re-reading the full spec.references/kit-distribution-commands.md— full flags and worked examples forsbx kit validate/inspect/pack/pull/push/provenance/sign/verify/add.
Assets
assets/spec-sandbox.yaml— a genuine minimalkind: sandboxkit thatextends: shellto inherit a real, working image rather than inventing one.assets/spec-mixin.yaml— a genuine minimalkind: mixinkit with no credentials at all (an egress-only extension), which composes cleanly with every built-in agent.
Checks
checks/verification.md— Schema, composition, egress, and kit-add checks (unexecuted integration runbook; isolated--app-name, no registry publishing or signing).