About js-secrets-extraction
js-secrets-extraction is a web security-testing skill for reviewing JavaScript bundles and source maps for exposed secrets, endpoints, routes, and source code. It is intended for authorized web assessments, with procedures for downloading, searching, reconstructing, and validating findings.
Key features
- 01JavaScript bundle collection and scanning
- 02Source map discovery and reconstruction
- 03Secret and credential pattern searches
- 04API, backend URL, and route extraction
- 05Analysis across ports and app chunks
- 06Finding validation guidance
Use cases
- 01Reviewing SPA bundles during web enumeration
- 02Checking source maps for original source and secrets
- 03Finding backend URLs and API paths in admin apps
- 04Validating suspected keys before reporting
Install
Copy the command and run it in a terminal.
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ uphiago/ recon-skills --skill js-secrets-extractionAfter installing, type/js-secrets-extractionin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.
Bundled filesscripts/scan_js.py
Details
From the project READMEJS Bundle & Source Map Analysis -- Secret Extraction
When to Use
- ALWAYS after initial web enumeration
- When you find modern SPA (React, Angular, Vue)
- When target uses Firebase, Supabase, Auth0
- Higher yield than directory scanning on many targets
Why Analyze JS Bundles
Modern JavaScript bundles (Webpack, Vite, esbuild) often contain:
- Hardcoded API keys and tokens
- Internal API URLs
- Firebase, Auth0, Supabase configurations
- Environment variables (VITE_, REACT_APP_, NEXT_PUBLIC_*)
- Internal routes
Bundle Download and Analysis
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://target.com" > index.html
grep -Eo 'src="[^"]*\.js"' index.html | cut -d'"' -f2 | while read js; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://target.com$js" > "$(basename $js)"
done
# Search for secrets in bundles
grep -rEn "(apiKey|api_key|API_KEY|token|secret|password|clientId|client_id|auth0|firebase|supabase)[\"'\"]?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[\"'\'][^\"'\']{8,}" *.js
Source Map Reconstruction
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com/assets/index-abc123.js.map"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com/static/js/main.12345.js.map"
# If HTTP 200, use for reconstruction:
# https://unminify.com
# https://source-map-visualization.netlify.app
Real-world case: Enterprise Angular SPA admin, 2 JS bundles (250KB each) exposed:
- Internal API URL (apiv3.empresa.com.br)
- Firebase API key (AIzaSy...2GXA)
- Encryption keys (AD5oDjsJaTJOzLe1Llj9mz)
- Cloudinary upload endpoint
Port-Specific URL Analysis
Modern deployments often serve the main SPA on port 443 and admin/API on separate ports (8080, 8081, 8084). Always check JS bundles on ALL discovered ports:
# Check source maps on every open port
for port in 443 8080 8081 8084; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com:$port/static/js/main.*.js.map" 2>/dev/null
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com:$port/assets/index-*.js.map" 2>/dev/null
done
Source maps on administrative or alternate-port applications may expose a different route and configuration set from the public SPA. Analyze each authorized application independently.
Admin Portal JS Analysis Pattern
When you find an admin portal on a separate port, the JS bundle often contains different secrets than the main site:
base = "https://target.com:8080" # Admin portal
js = requests.get(f"{base}/static/js/main.*.js").text
# 1. Extract ALL API URLs
api_urls = re.findall(r'https?://[^\"\'[[:space:]]\\n,)>\\]]+', js)
# 2. Find base API URL (the backend this admin talks to)
# 3. Look for hardcoded credentials, API keys, auth patterns
# 4. Extract route paths for the admin app
routes = re.findall(r'[\"\'](/[a-zA-Z0-9_/.-]*(?:admin|chat|bot|message|user|auth|login|token|config|setting|dashboard|hospital|pharmacy|drug|payment)[a-zA-Z0-9_/.-]*)[\"\']', js, re.IGNORECASE)
Source Map Content Analysis (1,200+ Files)
When source maps are available, analyze the sourcesContent array for hardcoded secrets:
import json, re
data = json.loads(open("bundle.js.map").read())
all_source = " ".join(data.get("sourcesContent", []))
# Search for credentials in the original source
patterns = {
"password": r'[\"\']([^\"\']*(?:password|passwd|pwd)[^\"\']*)[\"\']\s*[:=]\s*[\"\']([^\"\']+)[\"\']',
"token": r'[\"\']([^\"\']*(?:token|jwt|api_key|apikey|secret)[^\"\']*)[\"\']\s*[:=]\s*[\"\']([^\"\']+)[\"\']',
}
for name, pat in patterns.items():
matches = re.findall(pat, all_source, re.IGNORECASE)
if matches:
print(f"[{name}] {matches[:5]}")
- Cloudinary upload endpoint
Secret Regex Patterns Catalog
import re
patterns = {
"Firebase API Key": r'apiKey:\s*[\"\']([^\"\']{30,})',
"AWS Key": r'(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}',
"Google API Key": r'AIza[0-9A-Za-z\\-_]{35}',
"JWT": r'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{10,}',
"Mercado Pago": r'APP_USR-[a-f0-9]{8,}',
"Stripe": r'(?:sk_live|pk_live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}',
"Auth0 Domain": r'(?:domain|auth0_domain):\s*[\"\']([^\"\']+\.auth0\.com)',
"Auth0 Client ID": r'(?:client_id|clientId|AUTH0_CLIENT_ID):\s*[\"\']([^\"\']{20,})',
"Supabase URL": r'(?:supabaseUrl|SUPABASE_URL):\s*[\"\'](https://[^\"\']+\.supabase\.co)',
"Supabase Key": r'(?:supabaseKey|anonKey|SUPABASE_ANON_KEY):\s*[\"\'](eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]+)',
"Heroku": r'[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}',
"Generic Secret": r'(?:secret|password|token|key):\s*[\"\']([^\"\']{8,})',
}
Batch Bundle Download + Grep
import requests, re, json
base = "https://target.com"
html = requests.get(base).text
# Extract all JS URLs
js_urls = re.findall(r'src="([^"]*\.js)"', html)
for js_url in js_urls:
if js_url.startswith("/"):
js_url = base + js_url
content = requests.get(js_url).text
for name, pattern in patterns.items():
matches = re.findall(pattern, content)
for m in matches:
if isinstance(m, tuple):
m = m[0]
if len(m) > 6:
print(f"[{name}] {m[:80]}")
Pitfalls
| Issue | Solution |
|---|---|
| Bundles too large | Use grep -Eo with specific patterns |
| Minified code (1 char names) | Use source maps for reconstruction |
| False positive matches | Validate keys by testing API endpoint |
| Rate limiting | Add delays between bundle downloads |
Backend URL Discovery
JS bundles frequently leak production backend URLs, enabling direct API attacks bypassing CDN/WAF:
# Platform-specific backend URL patterns
grep -Eo 'https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.\-]+\.(fly\.dev|azurewebsites\.net|onrender\.com|vercel\.app|netlify\.app)[^"'\'' ]{0,40}' /tmp/*.js
grep -Eo 'https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.\-]+\.(supabase\.co|r2\.dev|blob\.vercel-storage\.com)[^"'\'' ]{0,40}' /tmp/*.js
# Edge function URLs
grep -Eo 'functions/v1/[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+' /tmp/*.js
# Internal API paths
grep -Eo '["\x60]/api/v1/[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+["\x60]' /tmp/*.js
Real Field Patterns
| Pattern | Platform | Example | Secret? |
|---|---|---|---|
*.fly.dev | Fly.io | ht-prod-backend.fly.dev | ✅ Backend URL |
*.azurewebsites.net | Azure | consigpro-api-prod-... | ✅ Backend URL |
*.onrender.com | Render | clickcity-api.onrender.com | ✅ Backend URL |
*.supabase.co | Supabase | jxhvjufqtabpeieyhkgk.supabase.co | ✅ Anon key is public; backend URL is intel |
*.r2.dev | Cloudflare R2 | pub-xxx.r2.dev | ✅ Storage URL |
functions/v1/* | Supabase Edge | provision-openrouter-key | ✅ Endpoint name |
dpl_* | Vercel DPL | dpl_BCoyPsxxYLZ... | ❌ NOT a secret — public deploy ID |
Verification
# Test Firebase API key
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://identitytoolkit.googleapis.com/v1/accounts:signUp?key=AIza..."
# Test Supabase anon key
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://PROJECT.supabase.co/rest/v1/users?limit=1" -H "apikey: ANON_KEY" -H "Authorization: Bearer ANON_KEY"
Phase 5 — Source Map Exploitation
Recover full pre-compiled source code when .js.map files are left in production:
# Find .map files via Wayback Machine
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=*.target.com/*&collapse=urlkey&output=text&fl=original&filter=original:.*\.js\.map$" \
| sort -u > map_urls.txt
# Download and extract source
wget https://target.com/static/app.js.map
node -e "
const map = require('./app.js.map');
map.sources.forEach((src, i) => {
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFileSync(src.split('/').pop(), map.sourcesContent[i]);
});
print('Extracted ' + map.sources.length + ' source files');
"
# Quick check: does a JS file have an available map?
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://target.com/static/app.js.map" | grep "200\|Content-Type"
Phase 6 — Deep JS Crawling
Crawl JS files recursively for embedded URLs, APIs, and IPs:
# lazyegg — crawls JS files for links, APIs, IPs
python3 lazyegg.py https://target.com
python3 lazyegg.py https://target.com/js/auth.js
# Combine with waybackurls for deep coverage
waybackurls target.com \
| grep '\.js$' \
| awk -F '?' '{print $1}' \
| sort -u \
| xargs -I{} bash -c 'python3 lazyegg.py "{}" --js_urls --domains --ips' \
> lazyegg_output.txt
# subjs — extract JS URLs from any URL list
cat all_urls.txt | subjs | tee js_files_full.txt
Phase 7 — Per-File AI-Assisted Code Review
JS bundles are source code — even minified. A disciplined per-file (per-chunk) review finds what autonomous agents miss:
# 1. Download all JS chunks
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com" | grep -Eo 'src="[^"]+\.js[^"]*"' | \
cut -d'"' -f2 | while read js; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "$js" -o "chunks/$(basename $js)"
done
# 2. Per-chunk pattern review for dangerous sinks
for chunk in chunks/*.js; do
echo "=== $chunk ==="
# eval / new Function (arbitrary code execution)
grep -Eon 'eval\s*\(|new\s+Function\s*\(' "$chunk"
# Hardcoded API keys/secrets
grep -Eon '(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|bearer)\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]{8,}' "$chunk"
# postMessage without origin check
grep -Eon 'postMessage\s*\(' "$chunk"
# Prototype pollution patterns
grep -Eon '__proto__|constructor\.prototype' "$chunk"
# Debug/test code in production
grep -Eoin 'debug|test|staging|localhost' "$chunk"
# Client-trusted flags
grep -Eon '(?:isAdmin|isVip|isPremium|isModerator|role)\s*[=:]\s*true' "$chunk"
done > ai_review_findings.txt
# 3. Review findings — each is a CANDIDATE, not confirmed
grep -c "===" ai_review_findings.txt # files reviewed
grep -c ":" ai_review_findings.txt # candidate findings
Key insight: autonomous agents told "find bugs" in a whole codebase burn budget and miss things. A guaranteed per-file pass with fixed output structure produces repeatable hits. Each finding still needs manual PoC verification.