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review

review

github.com/bseneTesting & quality7109 installsUpdated 1w ago
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About review

review is a code-review skill for coding agents that grounds findings in the actual diff and structures results around risk, blast radius, and validation evidence. It also specifies security checks, agent-authored change checks, and severity tiers.

Key features

  1. 01Inspects branch, staged, and unstaged diffs
  2. 02Limits findings to changes and assigns severity
  3. 03Checks tests and CI gate changes
  4. 04Reviews security and agent-authored code risks
  5. 05Retests approved fixes before further approval

Use cases

  1. 01Review code changes before merging
  2. 02Check agent-authored branches and tests
  3. 03Assess security risks before pushing

Install

Copy the command and run it in a terminal.

$npx skills add https://github.com/bsene/skills --skill review

After installing, type/reviewin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.

Bundled filesreferences/agentic-code-review.mdreferences/code-review-and-quality.md

Details

From the project README

/review

Workflow

  1. Get the actual scope, never reconstruct it: review a supplied diff; otherwise inspect git diff main...HEAD, git diff --cached, git diff, and git status --short. This includes tracked uncommitted work by default. If untracked files exist, ask the user whether to include them; state which parts were available.
  2. Read changed tests and CI/config before implementation. A behavior-changing test rewrite without a sound reason, or an unjustified weaker gate, is a Blocker.
  3. Produce structured review with risk, blast radius, and available test/validation evidence. When changed code has obvious callers, dependents, or public surface, recommend checking them and their relevant tests; do not turn every review into call-graph archaeology.
  4. Ask ≤5 grill-me questions — one per key design decision; design intent only, not style.
  5. On approval of specific fixes: apply them → run relevant tests and lint → stop and grill the user about remaining design or validation questions → ask explicit approval before committing.

Scope Discipline

Review only what changed — never report pre-existing, unmodified code as a finding. The diff is the contract, but it is not the only context: read a changed file or an obvious caller, dependent, or relevant test when needed to establish the changed code's impact. Real repos make this a hard rule:

Focus findings exclusively on changed code. Use surrounding code only to understand impact; do not turn a review into a backlog of pre-existing issues.

Security-Before-Push

For anything about to be pushed, run a security-focused review of the branch's own changes before shipping (optional trivy fs on vulnerable deps). Watch specifically for: logged secrets/tokens/PINs/PII, and __proto__/prototype-walking reads on untrusted config.

Agent-Authored Diffs

Run the test-tampering and CI-weakening checks in every review. If the branch was authored largely by an agent — or you suspect it was — also layer agentic-code-review. For every new or changed AI/LLM feature, inspect untrusted prompt input: it is a Blocker when it can influence privileged data or actions, otherwise a Concern. Tier review depth by blast radius, not by author; the human who clicks merge owns the change.

Severity Tiers

Classify the observed behavior, not a label: an incorrect calculation is a Blocker; a name or rename is a Nit unless the supplied diff or context proves it breaks compatibility or behavior. A renamed field on a returned/public shape is at most a Concern ("check consumers of the old name"), never a Blocker without a shown caller; never let it displace the real behavior bug.

TierCriterionRequired Action
BlockerIncorrect behavior, security hole, data loss, broken invariant, or unjustified weakened gateFix before merge
ConcernDesign flaw, missing evidence/test, or perf issue without demonstrated user harmDiscuss + likely fix
NitStyle, naming, minor duplicationOptional

If a performance finding may affect availability but its impact is unclear, ask the user whether to treat it as a Blocker before assigning a tier.

Output Format

## Review Context
- **Scope:** branch diff + staged + unstaged changes
- **Risk:** Medium
- **Blast radius:** `createInvoice()` feeds the payment record
- **Validation evidence:** no test output supplied

## Blockers
- `src/auth.ts:42` — expiry check uses `<` not `<=`; off-by-one passes expired tokens

## Concerns
- No test for error path in `processPayment()`

## Nits
- `userData` → `user` (same meaning, shorter)

## Questions
1. Why is `retryCount` hardcoded to 3 — should this be config?

Deep-Rigor Mode

When the user asks for a strict / thorough review (e.g. "/review --strict", "deep review", "rigorous review", "code quality audit"), layer the code-review-and-quality rubric on top of the workflow above: walk the five axes (correctness, readability, architecture, security, performance), promote its presumptive blockers into Blockers, and hold commits to its higher approval bar. For agent-authored branches, also layer agentic-code-review.

Related

Benchmark

Scenario: .benchmarks/scenarios/review-001-severity-tiers.md · Run: 2026-08-31 · Log: .benchmarks/runs/2026-08-31/review-001-severity-tiers.json

ModelWithoutWithDelta
claude-opus-4-867%83%+16%
claude-sonnet-4-683%67%−16%
claude-haiku-4-583%83%+0%

NEG (run 2026-08-31). Sonnet −16 on the severity-tier boundary; opus +16. Classification ambiguous between criteria and tier table — diagnostic c5-only re-run queued before any edit (cap reached). Gate per .agents/skills/skill-optimizer/rules/release-gates.md.

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