mcpField
T
threat-modeling

threat-modeling

github.com/dralgorhythmSecurity12994 installsUpdated 14w ago
Repository

About threat-modeling

threat-modeling is a security review skill for examining a system’s attack surface and documenting threats. It combines STRIDE analysis with checks for risks specific to agents and MCP tools.

Key features

  1. 01Map entry points and trust boundaries
  2. 02Apply STRIDE to system components
  3. 03Trace sensitive data and token flows
  4. 04Rate severity and record remediation
  5. 05Check agent-specific attack patterns

Use cases

  1. 01Review a system before merging changes
  2. 02Trace possible injection or data leakage
  3. 03Assess risks at tool and model boundaries

Install

Copy the command and run it in a terminal.

$npx skills add https://github.com/dralgorhythm/claude-agentic-framework --skill threat-modeling

After installing, type/threat-modelingin Claude Code to confirm it loaded.

Details

From the project README

Threat Modeling

Procedure

  1. Map Attack Surface: Use Grep and Glob to find entry points and trust boundaries; sketch the data flow.
  2. Enumerate Threats: Work through STRIDE per component — Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege. Use Sequential Thinking to cover each category systematically.
  3. Trace Data Flow: Use Grep to trace user input → processing → storage, authentication token flow, and sensitive data paths, watching for injection and leakage points.
  4. Rate Severity: Classify each threat as Critical / High / Medium / Low per the definitions in .claude/rules/security.md — Critical and High findings MUST be fixed before merge.
  5. Record Findings: Document each threat with its STRIDE category, severity, and remediation.

Agent-Specific Threats

Beyond STRIDE, include this class whenever the design under review has a tool/model boundary:

  • Indirect prompt injection: a directive embedded in tool output (fetched web page, file contents, API response) that the model executes as if the user had typed it
  • Tool poisoning: a compromised or malicious MCP server/tool that returns crafted output designed to manipulate the calling agent
  • Instruction-hierarchy violation: content from a lower-trust source (tool output, retrieved document) overriding system- or developer-level instructions
  • Over-scoped tokens: credentials or API keys granted broader access than the task requires, widening the blast radius of a successful injection
  • Config-as-code execution paths: hooks, settings, and MCP definitions that execute automatically on checkout — see .claude/rules/security.md's "Untrusted Content & Prompt Injection" section

Threat Model Document

## Asset: User Database

### Threats
| Threat | Type | Severity | Remediation |
|--------|------|----------|--------------|
| SQL Injection | Tampering | High | Parameterized queries |
| Data Breach | Info Disclosure | Critical | Encryption at rest, access logging |

Comments

Markdown supported