关于 ai-security-hardening
面向生产环境 AI 系统的安全加固技能,提供针对提示注入、数据泄露、越狱和供应链风险的防护实践。内容涉及过滤、API 安全、模型权重校验、网络隔离与审计。
主要功能
- 01提示注入防护
- 02输出过滤与 PII 清理
- 03LLM API 访问控制与限流
- 04模型权重完整性校验
- 05AI 服务网络隔离
- 06交互审计日志
适用场景
- 01保护处理敏感数据的 LLM 应用
- 02降低 AI Agent 遭受提示注入的风险
- 03过滤模型输出中的个人信息
- 04保护模型权重和 API 端点
安装
复制下面的命令,在终端中运行。
$
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ bagelhole/ devops-security-agent-skills --skill ai-security-hardening安装后在 Claude Code 中输入/ai-security-hardening确认已加载。
详细介绍
AI Security Hardening
在生产环境中保护 LLM 和 AI 系统,防范提示词注入、越狱、数据泄露和供应链威胁。
何时使用此技能
在以下情况下使用此技能:
- 部署处理敏感用户数据的 LLM 驱动应用
- 保护 AI Agent 免受提示词注入攻击
- 实施输出过滤和内容审核
- 保护模型权重和 API 端点免遭窃取
- 为 AI 系统实现 SOC2 或 ISO 27001 合规
AI 专属威胁模型
Threat Risk Control
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Prompt injection System prompt override Input sanitization, separate context
Data exfiltration PII in model outputs Output filtering, DLP scanning
Jailbreaking Policy bypass Content moderation, guardrails
Model theft Weight extraction via API Rate limiting, access controls
Training data poisoning Backdoored fine-tuned model Dataset validation, provenance
Supply chain attack Malicious model weights Signature verification, scanning
Insecure output XSS/SQLi from LLM response Output encoding, parameterized queries
提示词注入防御
import re
from typing import Optional
INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+instructions",
r"you\s+are\s+now\s+",
r"new\s+instructions?:",
r"system\s+prompt",
r"forget\s+everything",
r"act\s+as\s+",
r"jailbreak",
r"dan\s+mode",
r"<\s*system\s*>",
r"\[INST\]",
]
def detect_prompt_injection(user_input: str) -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""Return (is_suspicious, matched_pattern)."""
normalized = user_input.lower().strip()
for pattern in INJECTION_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, normalized, re.IGNORECASE):
return True, pattern
return False, None
def sanitize_user_input(user_input: str, max_length: int = 4000) -> str:
"""Sanitize input before passing to LLM."""
# Truncate
user_input = user_input[:max_length]
# Remove null bytes and control characters
user_input = re.sub(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]', '', user_input)
# Check for injection
suspicious, pattern = detect_prompt_injection(user_input)
if suspicious:
raise ValueError(f"Potential prompt injection detected: {pattern}")
return user_input
使用 NeMo Guardrails 设置护栏
# guardrails.yaml
from nemoguardrails import RailsConfig, LLMRails
config = RailsConfig.from_path("./guardrails-config")
rails = LLMRails(config)
async def safe_llm_call(user_message: str) -> str:
response = await rails.generate_async(
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": user_message}]
)
return response["content"]
# guardrails-config/config.yml
models:
- type: main
engine: openai
model: gpt-4o-mini
rails:
input:
flows:
- check jailbreak
- check sensitive data
output:
flows:
- check output for PII
- check output for harmful content
输出过滤与 PII 清理
import re
from presidio_analyzer import AnalyzerEngine
from presidio_anonymizer import AnonymizerEngine
analyzer = AnalyzerEngine()
anonymizer = AnonymizerEngine()
PII_ENTITIES = ["PERSON", "EMAIL_ADDRESS", "PHONE_NUMBER", "CREDIT_CARD",
"US_SSN", "IBAN_CODE", "IP_ADDRESS", "LOCATION"]
def scrub_pii_from_output(text: str) -> str:
"""Remove PII from LLM output before returning to user."""
results = analyzer.analyze(text=text, entities=PII_ENTITIES, language="en")
if not results:
return text
anonymized = anonymizer.anonymize(text=text, analyzer_results=results)
return anonymized.text
def validate_output_safety(output: str) -> bool:
"""Check output doesn't contain prompt injection artifacts."""
dangerous_patterns = [
r"<\s*script\s*>", # XSS
r"javascript:", # XSS
r";\s*(DROP|DELETE|INSERT)",# SQLi
r"\$\{.*\}", # template injection
r"`.*`", # command injection in some contexts
]
for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
if re.search(pattern, output, re.IGNORECASE):
return False
return True
LLM 端点的 API 安全
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Depends, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
import jwt
import time
from collections import defaultdict
app = FastAPI()
security = HTTPBearer()
# Rate limiting (per API key)
request_counts = defaultdict(list)
def rate_limit(api_key: str, max_requests: int = 100, window_seconds: int = 60):
now = time.time()
requests = request_counts[api_key]
# Remove old requests outside window
request_counts[api_key] = [t for t in requests if now - t < window_seconds]
if len(request_counts[api_key]) >= max_requests:
raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Rate limit exceeded")
request_counts[api_key].append(now)
async def verify_token(
credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security)
) -> dict:
try:
payload = jwt.decode(credentials.credentials, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=["HS256"])
rate_limit(payload["sub"])
return payload
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Token expired")
except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid token")
@app.post("/v1/chat/completions")
async def chat(request: Request, token: dict = Depends(verify_token)):
body = await request.json()
# Input validation
user_msg = body.get("messages", [{}])[-1].get("content", "")
try:
safe_input = sanitize_user_input(user_msg)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
# Call LLM and scrub output
response = await call_llm(safe_input, token["scope"])
response["choices"][0]["message"]["content"] = scrub_pii_from_output(
response["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]
)
return response
模型权重安全
# Verify model weights with SHA-256 hash before loading
MODEL_DIR="./models/llama-3.1-8b"
EXPECTED_HASH="sha256:abc123..."
# Generate hash of downloaded model
actual_hash=$(find "$MODEL_DIR" -name "*.safetensors" | sort | xargs sha256sum | sha256sum)
echo "Model hash: $actual_hash"
# Compare (automate in CI/CD)
if [ "$actual_hash" != "$EXPECTED_HASH" ]; then
echo "ERROR: Model hash mismatch — possible tampering!"
exit 1
fi
# Scan model files for embedded malware (ModelScan)
pip install modelscan
modelscan scan -p "$MODEL_DIR"
AI 服务的网络隔离
# Kubernetes NetworkPolicy — isolate LLM API
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: llm-api-isolation
namespace: ai-services
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: vllm
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: backend # only backend can call LLM
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8000
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: monitoring # metrics only
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 9090
# Block egress to internet — prevent data exfiltration
# (allow only internal cluster traffic)
审计日志
import structlog
from datetime import datetime, timezone
audit_log = structlog.get_logger("ai.audit")
def log_llm_interaction(
user_id: str,
session_id: str,
model: str,
prompt_tokens: int,
completion_tokens: int,
was_filtered: bool,
injection_detected: bool,
):
audit_log.info(
"llm_interaction",
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
user_id=user_id,
session_id=session_id,
model=model,
prompt_tokens=prompt_tokens,
completion_tokens=completion_tokens,
was_filtered=was_filtered,
injection_detected=injection_detected,
# DO NOT log prompt/completion content — PII risk
)
常见问题
| 问题 | 原因 | 修复方法 |
|---|---|---|
| 误报导致注入被拦截 | 正则表达式范围过宽 | 调整模式;高流量场景使用基于 ML 的分类器 |
| 模型输出包含 PII | 模型使用了包含 PII 的数据进行训练 | 在输出层添加 Presidio 清理 |
| API 密钥泄露 | 密钥出现在日志或响应中 | 在日志中屏蔽密钥;使用保管库存储密钥 |
| 模型权重被篡改 | 下载未经验证 | 始终验证 SHA-256;使用 modelscan |
| 绕过速率限制 | 按 IP 而非用户进行限制 | 按已认证用户 ID 而非 IP 进行速率限制 |
最佳实践
- 切勿记录原始提示词或补全内容——其中可能包含 PII 或敏感数据。
- 将 LLM 输出视为不可信输入——在 HTML 中渲染前务必进行编码。
- 使用网络策略阻止 LLM Pod 发起出站互联网请求。
- 每季度轮换 API 密钥;使用短期 JWT 令牌进行服务间身份验证。
- 在提供任何从互联网下载的模型之前,先运行
modelscan。
相关技能
- hashicorp-vault - API 密钥的机密管理
- network-security - 网络层控制
- linux-hardening - 主机加固
- agent-observability - AI 审计日志
- llm-gateway - 集中式访问控制
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