Cloud Security & Container Hardening

云安全与容器加固

目的

帮助 Claude 执行 AWS、Azure 和 GCP 云安全评估、容器和 Kubernetes 安全加固、基础设施即代码（Terraform、CloudFormation、Kubernetes 清单）扫描，以及依据 CIS 基准和主要框架生成云合规报告。

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激活条件

当用户询问以下内容时，将激活此技能：

• 审计 AWS IAM、S3、安全组或云服务
• 审查 Azure RBAC、存储、NSG 或 Key Vault 配置
• 评估 GCP IAM、Cloud Storage 或 GKE 安全性
• 扫描 Terraform 文件、CloudFormation 模板或 Kubernetes 清单
• 加固 Docker 容器或审查 Dockerfile
• Kubernetes RBAC、Pod 安全或网络策略
• 云合规性（CIS、SOC2、PCI-DSS、HIPAA）
• 容器镜像漏洞扫描
• 云架构安全审查
• IaC 安全扫描（tfsec、Checkov、Terrascan）

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先决条件

pip install pyyaml boto3 requests

推荐的云安全工具：

• AWS CLI — AWS 审计与管理
• ScoutSuite — 多云安全审计
• Prowler — AWS/Azure/GCP 安全评估
• Checkov — IaC 静态分析
• tfsec — Terraform 安全扫描器
• Trivy — 容器和 IaC 漏洞扫描器
• kube-bench — CIS Kubernetes 基准
• Falco — 容器运行时安全

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核心能力

1. AWS 安全审计

当用户要求审计 AWS 安全性时：

使用 CLI 快速检查 AWS 安全性：

# IAM: Find users without MFA
aws iam get-account-summary
aws iam list-users | jq '.Users[].UserName' | xargs -I{} aws iam list-mfa-devices --user-name {}

# Find overly permissive policies
aws iam list-policies --scope Local --only-attached | jq '.Policies[].PolicyName'

# S3: Find public buckets
aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[].Name' | xargs -I{} aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket {}
aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[].Name' | xargs -I{} aws s3api get-bucket-policy-status --bucket {}

# Security groups: Find wide-open rules
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filters "Name=ip-permission.cidr,Values=0.0.0.0/0" \
  --query 'SecurityGroups[*].{ID:GroupId,Name:GroupName,Rules:IpPermissions}'

# CloudTrail: Verify logging
aws cloudtrail describe-trails
aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name [trail-name]

# Root account check
aws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'

AWS IAM 安全检查清单：

Identity & Access Management:
[ ] Root account has MFA enabled
[ ] Root account has no access keys
[ ] All IAM users have MFA enabled
[ ] No IAM users with AdministratorAccess unless necessary
[ ] All IAM users have individual credentials (no shared)
[ ] Password policy: min 14 chars, complexity, rotation ≤90 days
[ ] Access keys rotated every 90 days
[ ] Unused credentials disabled (>90 days no use)
[ ] No inline policies; use managed policies

S3 Security:
[ ] Block Public Access enabled at account level
[ ] No buckets with public READ ACL
[ ] Server-side encryption enabled (SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS)
[ ] Versioning enabled for critical buckets
[ ] MFA Delete enabled for critical buckets
[ ] Access logging enabled
[ ] Bucket policies use HTTPS-only conditions

Networking:
[ ] No security groups with 0.0.0.0/0 → port 22 (SSH)
[ ] No security groups with 0.0.0.0/0 → port 3389 (RDP)
[ ] VPC Flow Logs enabled
[ ] No default VPC in use for production workloads
[ ] Private subnets for database and application tiers

Monitoring & Detection:
[ ] CloudTrail enabled in all regions
[ ] CloudTrail log file integrity validation enabled
[ ] GuardDuty enabled
[ ] Security Hub enabled and findings reviewed
[ ] Config rules configured for compliance
[ ] CloudWatch alarms for: root login, failed auth, security group changes

AWS 严重发现项模板：

**CRITICAL: S3 Bucket Publicly Readable**
Bucket: example-data-prod
Finding: GetBucketAcl returns AllUsers:READ
Risk: All objects publicly readable — potential data breach
Fix: aws s3api put-bucket-acl --bucket example-data-prod --acl private
     Enable: aws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket example-data-prod \
       --public-access-block-configuration BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true

**HIGH: Security Group Allows SSH from Internet**
Group: sg-0abc123 (web-servers)
Rule: Inbound TCP 22 from 0.0.0.0/0
Risk: SSH brute-force, CVE exploitation
Fix: Change source from 0.0.0.0/0 to your VPN/bastion host IP

2. Azure 安全审计

当用户要求审计 Azure 时：

# Login and set subscription
az login
az account set --subscription [subscription-id]

# Check RBAC assignments
az role assignment list --all --include-inherited \
  --query "[?roleDefinitionName=='Owner' || roleDefinitionName=='Contributor'].{Name:principalName,Role:roleDefinitionName}"

# Storage account public access
az storage account list --query "[?allowBlobPublicAccess==true].name"

# NSG rules allowing any source
az network nsg list --query "[*].{NSG:name}" | jq '.[].NSG' | xargs -I{} \
  az network nsg rule list --nsg-name {} --resource-group [rg] \
  --query "[?sourceAddressPrefix=='*'].{Rule:name,Port:destinationPortRange}"

# Key Vault access policies
az keyvault list --query "[*].name" | xargs -I{} az keyvault show --name {} \
  --query 'properties.accessPolicies'

Azure 安全检查清单：

Identity:
[ ] Global Administrator role has MFA
[ ] No more than 3-5 Global Administrators
[ ] Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for elevated roles
[ ] Guest accounts reviewed quarterly
[ ] Legacy authentication blocked (Conditional Access)

Storage:
[ ] No public blob containers (allowBlobPublicAccess = false)
[ ] Secure transfer required (HTTPS only)
[ ] Storage accounts use private endpoints
[ ] Storage logs enabled (read/write/delete)
[ ] Customer-managed keys for sensitive data

Networking:
[ ] NSGs restrict management ports (22, 3389) from internet
[ ] Azure DDoS Protection enabled
[ ] Network Watcher flow logs enabled

Monitoring:
[ ] Azure Monitor Diagnostic Settings for all resources
[ ] Security Center (Defender for Cloud) enabled
[ ] Log Analytics Workspace connected
[ ] Alerts for privileged role assignments

3. 容器安全（Docker）

当用户要求审查 Dockerfile 或容器安全性时：

Claude 会直接读取并分析 Dockerfile：

Dockerfile 安全审查：

# BEFORE (insecure)
FROM ubuntu:latest           # ← Never use latest
RUN apt-get install -y curl  # ← Install what you need during build
COPY . .                     # ← Copies everything including .env files
RUN chmod 777 /app           # ← World-writable is dangerous
CMD ["./app"]                # ← Runs as root by default
EXPOSE 0-65535               # ← Never expose all ports

# AFTER (secure)
FROM ubuntu:24.04 AS builder            # Pin specific version
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends curl \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*      # Clean up after install
WORKDIR /app

FROM ubuntu:24.04 AS runtime           # Multi-stage: minimal runtime image
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /app/bin/myapp ./  # Only copy what's needed
RUN groupadd -r appgroup && useradd -r -g appgroup appuser
RUN chown -R appuser:appgroup /app
USER appuser                           # Non-root user
EXPOSE 8080                            # Only expose necessary port
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s \
  CMD curl -f http://localhost:8080/health || exit 1
CMD ["./myapp"]

Dockerfile 审计检查清单：

[ ] Base image version pinned (not latest)
[ ] Multi-stage build used to minimize final image
[ ] Runs as non-root user (USER instruction)
[ ] No COPY . . (copies .env, secrets)
[ ] .dockerignore exists and excludes .env, *.key, secrets/
[ ] Package caches cleaned after installation (rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*)
[ ] No RUN commands with passwords, tokens, or secrets
[ ] HEALTHCHECK defined
[ ] Only necessary ports EXPOSE'd
[ ] Read-only filesystem where possible
[ ] No setuid/setgid binaries in final image

容器镜像扫描：

# Scan with Trivy
trivy image myapp:latest --severity HIGH,CRITICAL
trivy image myapp:latest --format json --output scan-results.json

# Docker bench security (runtime checks)
docker run --rm --net host --pid host --userns host --cap-add audit_control \
  -v /etc:/etc:ro -v /usr/bin/containerd:/usr/bin/containerd:ro \
  -v /usr/bin/runc:/usr/bin/runc:ro \
  -v /usr/lib/systemd:/usr/lib/systemd:ro \
  -v /var/lib:/var/lib:ro -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro \
  docker/docker-bench-security

4. Kubernetes 安全

当用户要求审计 Kubernetes 安全性时：

# Run CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
docker run --pid=host -v /etc:/etc:ro -v /var/lib:/var/lib:ro \
  -v /usr/bin/kubelet:/usr/bin/kubelet:ro \
  aquasec/kube-bench:latest

# Check for privileged pods
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \
  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged==true) | 
      .metadata.name + " in " + .metadata.namespace'

# Check RBAC for overly permissive ClusterRoles
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | \
  jq '.items[] | select(.roleRef.name=="cluster-admin") | .subjects[]?'

# Check for pods running as root
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \
  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.securityContext.runAsUser==0 or 
      .spec.containers[].securityContext.runAsUser==0) | .metadata.name'

安全 Pod 规范模板：

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: secure-app
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
    runAsGroup: 1000
    fsGroup: 2000
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  
  automountServiceAccountToken: false  # Disable unless needed
  
  containers:
  - name: app
    image: myapp:v1.2.3@sha256:abc123  # Pin by digest
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL              # Drop ALL capabilities
        add:
          - NET_BIND_SERVICE  # Add back only what's needed
    
    resources:
      requests:
        memory: "64Mi"
        cpu: "250m"
      limits:
        memory: "128Mi"      # Always set limits
        cpu: "500m"
    
    volumeMounts:
    - name: tmp
      mountPath: /tmp        # Writable volume for /tmp if needed
  
  volumes:
  - name: tmp
    emptyDir: {}

Kubernetes 安全检查清单：

RBAC:
[ ] No wildcards (*) in ClusterRole rules
[ ] cluster-admin role not assigned to service accounts
[ ] Each workload uses a dedicated service account
[ ] ServiceAccount token auto-mount disabled by default

Pod Security:
[ ] All pods have securityContext defined
[ ] runAsNonRoot: true for all containers
[ ] allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
[ ] readOnlyRootFilesystem: true where possible
[ ] capabilities: drop: [ALL]
[ ] No hostPID, hostIPC, hostNetwork
[ ] No privileged: true

Networking:
[ ] Default deny NetworkPolicy in all namespaces
[ ] Only required pod-to-pod communication allowed
[ ] Egress restricted (not just ingress)

Secrets Management:
[ ] No secrets in environment variables (use mounted secrets or vault)
[ ] No secrets in ConfigMaps
[ ] External secrets management (Vault, AWS SSM, Azure Key Vault)
[ ] ETCD encryption at rest enabled

Image Security:
[ ] All images from private registry (not Docker Hub public)
[ ] Image digest pinning (not mutable tags)
[ ] Admission controller (OPA, Kyverno) enforcing policy
[ ] Image scanning in CI/CD pipeline

5. IaC 安全扫描

当用户要求扫描 Terraform 或 CloudFormation 时：

Claude 会直接读取 IaC 文件并识别问题：

常见 Terraform 配置错误：

# INSECURE: S3 bucket with public access
resource "aws_s3_bucket" "bad" {
  bucket = "my-bucket"
  acl    = "public-read"          # ← PUBLIC READ!
}

# SECURE: S3 bucket with all public access blocked
resource "aws_s3_bucket" "good" {
  bucket = "my-bucket"
}
resource "aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block" "good" {
  bucket                  = aws_s3_bucket.good.id
  block_public_acls       = true
  block_public_policy     = true
  ignore_public_acls      = true
  restrict_public_buckets = true
}

# INSECURE: Security group allows all inbound
resource "aws_security_group_rule" "bad" {
  type        = "ingress"
  from_port   = 0
  to_port     = 65535
  protocol    = "tcp"
  cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]    # ← OPEN TO INTERNET!
}

自动化 IaC 扫描：

# Checkov (Terraform, CloudFormation, K8s, Dockerfile)
checkov -d ./terraform/ --framework terraform --output json > checkov-results.json
checkov -d ./k8s-manifests/ --framework kubernetes

# tfsec (Terraform focused)
tfsec ./terraform/ --format json --out tfsec-results.json

# Trivy (IaC, container, filesystem)
trivy config ./terraform/
trivy config ./k8s-manifests/

# Use iac_scanner.py
python scripts/iac_scanner.py --path ./terraform/ --output findings.json
python scripts/iac_scanner.py --path ./k8s-manifests/ --type kubernetes --output k8s_audit.json

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合规框架映射

发现项	CIS AWS	SOC2	PCI-DSS	HIPAA
未强制启用 MFA	1.10, 1.14	CC6.1	8.3.2	164.312(d)
S3 存储桶公开	2.1.5	CC6.7	3.4	164.312(a)(2)(iv)
CloudTrail 已禁用	3.1, 3.2	CC7.2	10.2	164.312(b)
SSH 对互联网开放	5.2	CC6.6	1.2.1	164.312(e)(1)
使用根账户	1.7	CC6.1	7.1.1	164.308(a)(1)

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脚本参考

iac_scanner.py

python scripts/iac_scanner.py --path ./terraform/ --output findings.json
python scripts/iac_scanner.py --path ./k8s-manifests/ --type kubernetes --output k8s_audit.json

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技能集成

条件	相邻技能
通过侦察发现云资产	← 技能 01（侦察与 OSINT）
用于 CSOC 警报的云漏洞	→ 技能 11（CSOC 自动化）
实施云加固建议	→ 技能 15（蓝队防御）

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参考资料

• 云 CIS 基准
• AWS Well-Architected 安全支柱
• Azure Security Benchmark v3
• GCP 安全最佳实践
• CIS Kubernetes 基准
• Checkov 文档
• Prowler 文档

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v3.0 增强（2026 年更新）

以攻击路径为导向的云安全：

• 身份即边界 — 枚举权限提升路径（权限过宽的角色、iam:PassRole、通配符操作、跨账户信任、与 CI/CD 的 OIDC 联合）。从攻击路径（CNAPP/CSPM 风格）的角度思考，而不是孤立的错误配置。
• 实例元数据 — 在 AWS 上要求使用 IMDSv2，并将跳数限制设为 1；验证 Azure/GCP 的元数据防护是否能抵御 SSRF（关联技能 09）。
• Kubernetes 2026 — Pod Security Admission（baseline/restricted）、工作负载身份（EKS Pod Identity / GKE Workload Identity / AKS）、不向默认 SA 授予 cluster-admin、默认拒绝的网络策略，以及准入控制（OPA/Gatekeeper、Kyverno）。
• CI/CD 与供应链 — 流水线中的密钥、对云的 OIDC 信任、制品签名（Sigstore/cosign）、SLSA 来源证明，以及 Terraform 状态文件暴露。
• 运行时 — 使用 eBPF 运行时检测（Falco/Tetragon）检测容器逃逸和加密货币挖矿；将发现映射到 MITRE ATT&CK for Cloud/Containers。

精确性规则： 将每项发现报告为错误配置 → 可触达的身份/数据 → 影响范围，并提供准确的 CLI/IaC 修复方案。