关于 implementing-threat-modeling-with-mitre-attack
面向 SOC 团队和安全负责人,指导使用 MITRE ATT&CK 建立并持续更新威胁模型。通过对照威胁行为与现有检测覆盖,识别缺口、规划修复并验证防御。
主要功能
- 01识别相关威胁组织及其 TTP
- 02生成 ATT&CK Navigator 威胁图层
- 03映射检测规则并分析覆盖缺口
- 04制定检测修复优先级
- 05通过对手模拟验证覆盖情况
适用场景
- 01评估针对行业威胁组织的检测能力
- 02为云迁移规划检测策略
- 03依据覆盖缺口制定紫队演练
- 04以检测盲点支持预算论证
安装
复制下面的命令,在终端中运行。
$
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ mukul975/ anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill implementing-threat-modeling-with-mitre-attack安装后在 Claude Code 中输入/implementing-threat-modeling-with-mitre-attack确认已加载。
包含的文件
除 SKILL.md 外,安装时一起下载的参考资料和脚本。
LICENSEreferences/api-reference.mdscripts/agent.py详细介绍
使用 MITRE ATT&CK 实施威胁建模
使用时机
在以下情况下使用此技能:
- SOC 团队需要评估针对相关威胁行为者及其 TTP 的检测覆盖情况
- 安全负责人需要根据威胁情报确定防御优先级
- 新环境(云迁移、OT 集成)需要规划检测策略
- 紫队演练需要基于威胁模型开展结构化的对手模拟
- 年度风险评估需要基于 ATT&CK 分析威胁态势
请勿将其作为一次性练习使用——随着对手 TTP 的演变和组织攻击面变化,必须持续更新威胁模型。
前提条件
- 了解 MITRE ATT&CK 框架(Enterprise、ICS、Mobile 或 Cloud 矩阵)
- ATT&CK Navigator 工具(网页版或本地版),用于可视化图层
- 已映射到 ATT&CK 技术 ID 的当前检测规则清单
- 关于攻击你所在行业的对手团体的威胁情报
- 包含关键性分类的组织资产清单
工作流
步骤 1:识别相关威胁行为者
使用 MITRE ATT&CK Groups 研究攻击你所在行业的对手团体:
import requests
import json
# Download ATT&CK STIX data
response = requests.get(
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre/cti/master/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack.json"
)
attack_data = response.json()
# Extract groups and their techniques
groups = {}
for obj in attack_data["objects"]:
if obj["type"] == "intrusion-set":
group_name = obj["name"]
aliases = obj.get("aliases", [])
description = obj.get("description", "")
groups[group_name] = {
"aliases": aliases,
"description": description[:200],
"techniques": []
}
# Map techniques to groups via relationships
relationships = [obj for obj in attack_data["objects"] if obj["type"] == "relationship"]
techniques = {obj["id"]: obj for obj in attack_data["objects"]
if obj["type"] == "attack-pattern"}
for rel in relationships:
if rel["relationship_type"] == "uses":
source = rel["source_ref"]
target = rel["target_ref"]
for group_name, group_data in groups.items():
if source == group_data.get("id") and target in techniques:
tech = techniques[target]
ext_refs = tech.get("external_references", [])
for ref in ext_refs:
if ref.get("source_name") == "mitre-attack":
group_data["techniques"].append(ref["external_id"])
# Example: Financial sector threat actors
financial_actors = ["FIN7", "FIN8", "Carbanak", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]
for actor in financial_actors:
if actor in groups:
print(f"{actor}: {len(groups[actor]['techniques'])} techniques")
print(f" Top techniques: {groups[actor]['techniques'][:10]}")
步骤 2:构建威胁行为者 TTP 概况
为优先级较高的威胁行为者创建 ATT&CK Navigator 图层:
import json
def create_attack_layer(actor_name, techniques, color="#ff6666"):
"""Generate ATT&CK Navigator JSON layer for a threat actor"""
layer = {
"name": f"{actor_name} TTP Profile",
"versions": {
"attack": "15",
"navigator": "5.0",
"layer": "4.5"
},
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"description": f"Techniques associated with {actor_name}",
"techniques": [
{
"techniqueID": tech_id,
"tactic": "",
"color": color,
"comment": f"Used by {actor_name}",
"enabled": True,
"score": 1
}
for tech_id in techniques
],
"gradient": {
"colors": ["#ffffff", color],
"minValue": 0,
"maxValue": 1
}
}
return layer
# Create layers for top threat actors
fin7_techniques = ["T1566.001", "T1059.001", "T1053.005", "T1547.001",
"T1078", "T1021.001", "T1003", "T1071.001", "T1041"]
layer = create_attack_layer("FIN7", fin7_techniques, "#ff6666")
with open("fin7_layer.json", "w") as f:
json.dump(layer, f, indent=2)
步骤 3:映射当前检测覆盖情况
导出已映射到 ATT&CK 的当前检测规则:
--- Extract ATT&CK technique mappings from Splunk ES correlation searches
| rest /services/saved/searches
splunk_server=local
| where match(title, "^(COR|ESCU|RBA):")
| eval techniques = if(isnotnull(action.correlationsearch.annotations),
spath(action.correlationsearch.annotations, "mitre_attack"),
"unmapped")
| stats count by techniques
| mvexpand techniques
| stats count by techniques
| rename techniques AS technique_id, count AS rule_count
创建检测覆盖图层:
def create_coverage_layer(detection_rules):
"""Generate coverage layer from detection rule inventory"""
technique_counts = {}
for rule in detection_rules:
for tech in rule.get("techniques", []):
technique_counts[tech] = technique_counts.get(tech, 0) + 1
layer = {
"name": "SOC Detection Coverage",
"versions": {"attack": "15", "navigator": "5.0", "layer": "4.5"},
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"techniques": [
{
"techniqueID": tech_id,
"color": "#31a354" if count >= 2 else "#a1d99b" if count == 1 else "",
"score": count,
"comment": f"{count} detection rule(s)"
}
for tech_id, count in technique_counts.items()
],
"gradient": {
"colors": ["#ffffff", "#a1d99b", "#31a354"],
"minValue": 0,
"maxValue": 3
}
}
return layer
步骤 4:执行差距分析
将威胁行为者的 TTP 与检测覆盖情况进行叠加比较:
def gap_analysis(threat_techniques, covered_techniques):
"""Identify detection gaps for specific threat actor"""
gaps = set(threat_techniques) - set(covered_techniques)
covered = set(threat_techniques) & set(covered_techniques)
print(f"Threat Actor Techniques: {len(threat_techniques)}")
print(f"Detected: {len(covered)} ({len(covered)/len(threat_techniques)*100:.0f}%)")
print(f"Gaps: {len(gaps)} ({len(gaps)/len(threat_techniques)*100:.0f}%)")
# Prioritize gaps by kill chain phase
priority_order = {
"TA0001": 1, "TA0002": 2, "TA0003": 3, "TA0004": 4,
"TA0005": 5, "TA0006": 6, "TA0007": 7, "TA0008": 8,
"TA0009": 9, "TA0010": 10, "TA0011": 11, "TA0040": 12
}
gap_details = []
for tech_id in gaps:
gap_details.append({
"technique": tech_id,
"priority": "HIGH" if tech_id.split(".")[0] in ["T1003", "T1021", "T1059"] else "MEDIUM",
"recommendation": f"Build detection for {tech_id}"
})
return {
"total_actor_techniques": len(threat_techniques),
"covered": len(covered),
"gaps": len(gaps),
"coverage_pct": round(len(covered)/len(threat_techniques)*100, 1),
"gap_details": sorted(gap_details, key=lambda x: x["priority"])
}
# Run analysis
result = gap_analysis(fin7_techniques, current_coverage)
步骤 5:制定优先级整改计划
构建检测工程路线图:
threat_model_remediation_plan:
assessed_date: 2024-03-15
primary_threats:
- FIN7 (Financial sector)
- APT38 (DPRK financial)
- Lazarus Group (Destructive)
current_coverage: 64%
target_coverage: 80%
priority_1_gaps: # 30-day target
- technique: T1021.002
name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
data_source: Windows Security Event 5140
effort: Low
detection_approach: Monitor admin share access from non-admin workstations
- technique: T1003.006
name: DCSync
data_source: Windows Security Event 4662
effort: Medium
detection_approach: Detect DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources
priority_2_gaps: # 60-day target
- technique: T1055
name: Process Injection
data_source: Sysmon EventCode 8, 10
effort: High
detection_approach: Monitor cross-process memory access patterns
- technique: T1071.001
name: Web Protocols (C2)
data_source: Proxy/Firewall logs
effort: Medium
detection_approach: Detect beaconing patterns in HTTP/S traffic
priority_3_gaps: # 90-day target
- technique: T1070.004
name: File Deletion
data_source: Sysmon EventCode 23
effort: Low
detection_approach: Monitor mass file deletion in sensitive directories
步骤 6:通过对手模拟进行验证
使用 MITRE Caldera 或 Atomic Red Team 测试覆盖情况:
# Using Atomic Red Team to validate coverage for FIN7 techniques
# T1566.001 — Spearphishing Attachment
Invoke-AtomicTest T1566.001
# T1059.001 — PowerShell
Invoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1,2,3
# T1053.005 — Scheduled Task
Invoke-AtomicTest T1053.005
# T1547.001 — Registry Run Keys
Invoke-AtomicTest T1547.001
# T1003 — Credential Dumping
Invoke-AtomicTest T1003 -TestNumbers 1,2
# Verify detections
# Check SIEM for corresponding alerts within 15 minutes
记录模拟结果,以验证威胁模型的准确性。
核心概念
| 术语 | 定义 |
|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK | 基于现实观察构建的对手战术、技术和流程知识库 |
| TTP | 战术、技术和流程——对手团体的行为模式 |
| ATT&CK Navigator | 用于将 ATT&CK 矩阵可视化为分层热力图的 Web 工具,可展示覆盖情况或威胁概况 |
| 差距分析 | 将威胁行为者的 TTP 与检测覆盖情况进行比较,以识别盲区的过程 |
| 威胁知情防御 | 根据真实对手行为而非理论风险确定防御优先级的安全策略 |
| 对手模拟 | 对威胁行为者的 TTP 进行受控模拟,以验证检测和响应能力 |
工具和系统
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator:基于 Web 的可视化工具,用于创建和叠加 ATT&CK 技术图层
- MITRE Caldera:自动化对手模拟平台,可大规模测试检测覆盖情况
- Atomic Red Team:用于验证安全控制的 ATT&CK 技术开源测试库
- CTID ATT&CK Workbench:MITRE 工具,可结合组织情境自定义 ATT&CK 知识库
- Tidal Cyber:基于 ATT&CK 框架制定威胁知情防御计划的商业平台
常见场景
- 年度威胁评估:将排名前 5 的威胁行为者映射到 ATT&CK,与检测覆盖情况叠加比较,并生成差距分析
- 云迁移规划:建模云环境特定威胁(T1078.004、T1537),并规划检测覆盖情况
- 并购安全评估:针对相关威胁行为者,对被收购公司的环境进行威胁建模
- 预算论证:利用差距分析展示需要投入工具的检测盲区
- 紫队规划:根据威胁模型中优先级最高的差距,选择对手模拟场景
输出格式
THREAT MODEL ASSESSMENT — Financial Services Division
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Date: 2024-03-15
Threat Actors: FIN7, APT38, Lazarus Group
Techniques Total: 87 unique techniques across all actors
DETECTION COVERAGE:
Covered: 56/87 (64%)
Gaps: 31/87 (36%)
Tactic Coverage Breakdown:
Initial Access: 78% ████████░░
Execution: 82% █████████░
Persistence: 71% ████████░░
Priv Escalation: 65% ███████░░░
Defense Evasion: 52% ██████░░░░ <-- Priority gap
Credential Access: 58% ██████░░░░ <-- Priority gap
Discovery: 45% █████░░░░░
Lateral Movement: 61% ███████░░░
Collection: 50% ██████░░░░
Exfiltration: 55% ██████░░░░
C2: 67% ███████░░░
TOP PRIORITY GAPS (30-day remediation):
1. T1055 Process Injection — used by all 3 actors, 0 detections
2. T1003.006 DCSync — used by FIN7 and Lazarus, 0 detections
3. T1070.004 File Deletion — evidence destruction, 0 detections
INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION:
Closing top 10 gaps requires: 2 detection engineer FTEs, 60 days
Expected coverage improvement: 64% -> 76%
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