关于 investigating-insider-threat-indicators
面向安全团队的内部威胁调查技能,使用 SIEM、DLP、终端、邮件和访问日志开展经授权的调查。协助构建活动时间线、识别疑似数据外传或异常访问,并在法律与 HR 协调下保存证据。
主要功能
- 01调查范围与授权规划
- 02SIEM 活动时间线分析
- 03数据外传指标检测
- 04访问异常分析
- 05关联 HR 与物理门禁记录
- 06证据保全与报告
适用场景
- 01审查离职员工的活动
- 02调查批量下载或传输
- 03核查超出岗位职责的访问
- 04为调查记录证据
安装
复制下面的命令,在终端中运行。
$
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ mukul975/ anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill investigating-insider-threat-indicators安装后在 Claude Code 中输入/investigating-insider-threat-indicators确认已加载。
包含的文件
除 SKILL.md 外,安装时一起下载的参考资料和脚本。
LICENSEreferences/api-reference.mdscripts/agent.py详细介绍
调查内部威胁指标
何时使用
在以下情况下使用此技能:
- HR 移交一名即将离职的员工,要求在其通知期内进行监控
- DLP 告警显示大量数据下载或向个人存储位置的传输
- UEBA 检测到与同岗位基准显著偏离的异常访问模式
- 管理层报告称担心某员工访问其职责范围之外的敏感数据
不要在未获得适当法律授权的情况下使用——内部威胁调查必须在监控开始前与 HR、法务和隐私团队协调进行。
前提条件
- 法律授权和 HR 移交文件,记录调查的正当理由
- 具备 DLP、终端、电子邮件、代理和身份验证日志来源的 SIEM
- 带有策略告警的数据丢失防护(DLP)系统(Microsoft Purview、Symantec、Forcepoint)
- 终端监控能力(具备 USB/可移动媒体日志记录的 EDR)
- 提供任职状态、通知日期和访问权限的 HR 数据源
- 用于证据保全的证据保管链程序
工作流
步骤 1:确定调查范围和法律授权
在任何监控之前,确保获得适当授权:
INSIDER THREAT INVESTIGATION AUTHORIZATION
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Case ID: IT-2024-0089
Subject: [Employee Name] — [Department]
Authorized By: [CISO / General Counsel]
Referral Source: HR — Employee submitted resignation, 2-week notice
Justification: Employee has access to trade secrets and customer PII
Scope: Email, file access, USB, cloud storage, printing
Duration: 2024-03-15 to 2024-03-29 (notice period)
Privacy Review: Completed — compliant with acceptable use policy
步骤 2:从 SIEM 构建活动时间线
查询调查对象的全面活动:
index=* (user="jsmith" OR src_user="jsmith" OR sender="[email protected]"
OR SubjectUserName="jsmith")
earliest="2024-03-01" latest=now
| eval event_category = case(
sourcetype LIKE "%dlp%", "DLP",
sourcetype LIKE "%proxy%", "Web Access",
sourcetype LIKE "%email%", "Email",
sourcetype LIKE "%WinEventLog%", "Endpoint",
sourcetype LIKE "%o365%", "Cloud",
sourcetype LIKE "%vpn%", "VPN",
sourcetype LIKE "%badge%", "Physical Access",
1=1, sourcetype
)
| stats count by event_category, sourcetype, _time
| timechart span=1d count by event_category
步骤 3:检测数据外泄指标
大量文件下载(SharePoint/OneDrive):
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Operation IN ("FileDownloaded", "FileSynced")
UserId="[email protected]" earliest=-30d
| stats count AS downloads, sum(eval(if(isnotnull(FileSize), FileSize, 0))) AS total_bytes,
dc(SourceFileName) AS unique_files
by UserId, SiteUrl, _time
| bin _time span=1d
| eval total_gb = round(total_bytes / 1073741824, 2)
| where downloads > 50 OR total_gb > 1
| sort - total_gb
USB/可移动媒体使用:
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Computer="WORKSTATION-JSMITH"
(CommandLine="*removable*" OR CommandLine="*usb*"
OR Image="*\\xcopy*" OR Image="*\\robocopy*")
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine
| append [
search index=endpoint sourcetype="endpoint:device_connect"
user="jsmith" device_type="removable"
| table _time, user, device_name, device_serial, action
]
| sort _time
基于电子邮件的外泄:
index=email sourcetype="o365:messageTrace"
SenderAddress="[email protected]"
| eval is_external = if(match(RecipientAddress, "@company\.com$"), 0, 1)
| eval has_attachment = if(isnotnull(AttachmentName), 1, 0)
| stats count AS total_emails,
sum(is_external) AS external_emails,
sum(has_attachment) AS with_attachments,
sum(eval(if(is_external=1 AND has_attachment=1, 1, 0))) AS external_with_attach,
sum(Size) AS total_size_bytes
by SenderAddress
| eval external_attach_pct = round(external_with_attach / total_emails * 100, 1)
| eval total_size_mb = round(total_size_bytes / 1048576, 1)
云存储上传检测:
index=proxy user="jsmith"
(dest IN ("*dropbox.com", "*drive.google.com", "*onedrive.live.com",
"*box.com", "*wetransfer.com", "*mega.nz")
OR category="cloud-storage")
http_method=POST
| stats count AS uploads, sum(bytes_out) AS total_uploaded
by user, dest, category
| eval uploaded_mb = round(total_uploaded / 1048576, 1)
| sort - uploaded_mb
步骤 4:分析访问模式异常
访问正常范围之外的敏感系统:
index=auth user="jsmith" action=success earliest=-30d
| stats dc(app) AS unique_apps, values(app) AS apps_accessed by user
| join user type=left [
| inputlookup role_app_mapping.csv
| search role="Financial Analyst"
| stats values(authorized_app) AS authorized_apps by role
| eval user="jsmith"
]
| eval unauthorized = mvfilter(NOT match(apps_accessed, mvjoin(authorized_apps, "|")))
| where isnotnull(unauthorized)
| table user, unauthorized, authorized_apps
非工作时间和周末活动:
index=* user="jsmith" earliest=-30d
| eval hour = tonumber(strftime(_time, "%H"))
| eval is_offhours = if(hour < 7 OR hour > 19, 1, 0)
| eval day = strftime(_time, "%A")
| eval is_weekend = if(day IN ("Saturday", "Sunday"), 1, 0)
| stats count AS total, sum(is_offhours) AS offhours, sum(is_weekend) AS weekend by user
| eval offhours_pct = round(offhours / total * 100, 1)
| eval weekend_pct = round(weekend / total * 100, 1)
步骤 5:与 HR 和物理安全数据关联
将活动与离职时间线进行比对:
| makeresults
| eval user="jsmith",
resignation_date="2024-03-15",
last_day="2024-03-29",
access_revocation="2024-03-29 17:00"
| join user [
search index=* user="jsmith" earliest=-90d
| bin _time span=1d
| stats count AS daily_events, dc(sourcetype) AS data_sources by user, _time
]
| eval phase = case(
_time < relative_time(now(), "-30d"), "Normal (Pre-Resignation)",
_time >= strptime(resignation_date, "%Y-%m-%d") AND _time <= strptime(last_day, "%Y-%m-%d"),
"Notice Period",
1=1, "Transition"
)
| chart avg(daily_events) AS avg_events by phase
门禁/物理访问关联:
index=badge_access employee_id="jsmith" earliest=-30d
| stats count AS badge_events, values(door_name) AS doors_accessed,
earliest(_time) AS first_badge, latest(_time) AS last_badge by employee_id
| eval areas = mvcount(doors_accessed)
步骤 6:保全证据并记录发现
为所有收集到的证据维护保管链:
import hashlib
import json
from datetime import datetime
evidence_log = {
"case_id": "IT-2024-0089",
"investigator": "soc_analyst_tier2",
"collection_time": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"items": [
{
"item_id": "EV-001",
"description": "Splunk export — all user activity 2024-03-01 to 2024-03-15",
"file": "jsmith_activity_export.csv",
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(open("jsmith_activity_export.csv", "rb").read()).hexdigest(),
"collected_by": "analyst_doe",
"collection_method": "Splunk search export"
},
{
"item_id": "EV-002",
"description": "DLP alert details — 47 policy violations",
"file": "dlp_alerts_jsmith.json",
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(open("dlp_alerts_jsmith.json", "rb").read()).hexdigest(),
"collected_by": "analyst_doe",
"collection_method": "Microsoft Purview export"
}
]
}
with open(f"evidence_log_{evidence_log['case_id']}.json", "w") as f:
json.dump(evidence_log, f, indent=2)
关键概念
| 术语 | 定义 |
|---|---|
| 内部威胁 | 拥有合法访问权限的个人将其滥用于未经授权目的所带来的风险 |
| 数据外泄 | 通过电子邮件、USB、云或其他渠道将数据未经授权地传输到组织外部 |
| DLP | 数据丢失防护——基于内容策略监控并阻止未经授权数据传输的技术 |
| 通知期监控 | 在员工从提出辞职到离开的时间窗口内对其进行加强监控 |
| 保管链 | 记录在案的证据处理程序,确保在可能的法律诉讼中保持取证完整性 |
| 知需违规 | 访问超出员工职责或当前任务所需的信息或系统 |
工具与系统
- Microsoft Purview(原 DLP):数据分类和丢失防护平台,监控终端、电子邮件和云存储
- Splunk UBA:通过基于 ML 的异常检测识别内部威胁模式的用户行为分析系统
- Forcepoint Insider Threat:专门的内部威胁检测平台,具备行为指标和风险评分
- DTEX InTERCEPT:基于终端的内部威胁检测,专注于用户活动元数据收集
- Code42 Incydr:数据风险检测平台,专门监控跨终端和云的文件外泄
常见场景
- 即将离职的员工:在两周通知期内大量下载客户名单和产品路线图
- 心怀不满的员工:在负面绩效评估后,该员工访问其职责范围之外的高管薪资数据
- 承包商越权:外部顾问访问合同范围之外的系统,下载源代码
- 账户滥用:员工与未经授权的第三方共享凭据以获取竞争情报
- 破坏指标:IT 管理员在离职前创建后门账户并修改系统配置
Output Format
INSIDER THREAT INVESTIGATION REPORT — IT-2024-0089
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Subject: jsmith (Financial Analyst, Finance Dept)
Period: 2024-03-01 to 2024-03-15
Status: Employee resigned 2024-03-15, last day 2024-03-29
Key Findings:
[HIGH] 3,847 files downloaded from SharePoint (12.4 GB) — 10x peer average
[HIGH] USB device connected 14 times during notice period (0 times prior month)
[HIGH] 187 emails with attachments sent to personal Gmail
[MEDIUM] After-hours activity increased 340% during notice period
[MEDIUM] Accessed HR salary database 3 times (not authorized for role)
Timeline:
Mar 01-14: Normal activity baseline (avg 150 events/day)
Mar 15: Resignation submitted (activity spike to 890 events)
Mar 16-17: Weekend access — 2,100 SharePoint downloads
Mar 18: USB device first connected, DLP alert triggered
Evidence Collected: 4 items (SHA-256 verified, chain of custody documented)
Recommendation: Immediate access revocation recommended
Evidence package prepared for Legal review
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