关于 performing-power-grid-cybersecurity-assessment
面向电网环境评估的安全技能,适用于变电站、EMS/SCADA 和同步相量网络。它指导架构梳理与协议安全检查,可用于 NERC CIP 合规及内部安全评估。
主要功能
- 01电网网络安全架构梳理
- 02IEC 61850 变电站安全评估
- 03EMS/SCADA 安全评估
- 04同步相量网络评估
- 05准备 NERC CIP 审计
适用场景
- 01开展定期电网网络安全评估
- 02检查变电站 GOOSE 和 MMS 流量
- 03评估 EMS 或 SCADA 控制中心
- 04准备合规审计
安装
复制下面的命令,在终端中运行。
$
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ mukul975/ anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-power-grid-cybersecurity-assessment安装后在 Claude Code 中输入/performing-power-grid-cybersecurity-assessment确认已加载。
包含的文件
除 SKILL.md 外,安装时一起下载的参考资料和脚本。
LICENSEreferences/api-reference.mdscripts/agent.py详细介绍
执行电网网络安全评估
何时使用
- 当按照 NERC CIP 要求对电网设施开展周期性网络安全评估时
- 当评估使用 IEC 61850 GOOSE 和 MMS 协议的变电站自动化系统时
- 当评估能量管理系统(EMS)或 SCADA 控制中心的安全性时
- 当评估同步相量(PMU)网络和广域监测系统时
- 当为区域实体合规审计或内部安全审查做准备时
不要使用于低于 NERC 注册阈值的非 BES 系统、不具备电网特定内容的通用 OT 评估(参见 performing-ot-network-security-assessment),或不涉及网络范围的发电设施物理安全评估。
前置条件
- 理解电网架构(发电、输电、配电)
- 熟悉 NERC CIP 标准和 BES 网络系统分类
- 了解电网协议(IEC 61850、IEC 60870-5-104、DNP3、ICCP/TASE.2)
- 用于变电站网络流量分析的被动监控工具
- 可访问 EMS/SCADA 架构文档和网络图
工作流
步骤 1:绘制电网网络架构
识别并记录所有支持电网运行的网络系统,包括 EMS、SCADA、变电站自动化和通信基础设施。
# Power Grid Cyber Architecture Assessment
facility_type: "Regional Transmission Organization Control Center"
ems_systems:
primary_ems:
vendor: "GE Grid Solutions"
product: "EMS/SCADA (formerly XA/21)"
functions:
- "State estimation"
- "Automatic generation control (AGC)"
- "Security-constrained economic dispatch"
- "Contingency analysis"
protocols:
- "ICCP/TASE.2 (inter-control center)"
- "DNP3 (substation RTU polling)"
- "IEC 60870-5-104 (substation polling)"
backup_control_center:
location: "Geographically diverse backup site"
sync_method: "Real-time database mirroring"
switchover_time: "< 5 minutes"
substation_automation:
count: 145
system_types:
- vendor: "ABB"
product: "RTU560"
protocol: "DNP3 over TCP/IP"
count: 85
- vendor: "SEL"
product: "SEL-3530 RTAC"
protocol: "IEC 61850 MMS + GOOSE"
count: 40
- vendor: "Siemens"
product: "SICAM A8000"
protocol: "IEC 60870-5-104"
count: 20
communications:
primary: "MPLS WAN (carrier-provided)"
backup: "Licensed microwave radio"
last_mile: "Fiber optic to substation"
synchrophasor_network:
pmu_count: 75
pdc: "GE PDC (Phasor Data Concentrator)"
communication: "IEEE C37.118.2 over dedicated network"
data_rate: "30-60 samples per second"
步骤 2:评估变电站自动化安全
评估基于 IEC 61850 的变电站自动化的协议安全、访问控制和网络分段。
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Power Grid Substation Security Assessor.
Evaluates security of IEC 61850-based substation automation
systems including GOOSE messaging, MMS client/server, and
network architecture.
"""
import json
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, asdict
from datetime import datetime
@dataclass
class SubstationFinding:
finding_id: str
severity: str
category: str
title: str
description: str
affected_systems: list
nerc_cip_ref: str
iec_62351_ref: str
remediation: str
class SubstationAssessment:
"""Assesses cybersecurity of substation automation systems."""
def __init__(self, substation_name):
self.name = substation_name
self.findings = []
self.counter = 1
def assess_iec61850_security(self, config):
"""Assess IEC 61850 protocol security."""
# GOOSE message authentication
if not config.get("goose_authentication"):
self.findings.append(SubstationFinding(
finding_id=f"SUB-{self.counter:03d}",
severity="critical",
category="Protocol Security",
title="IEC 61850 GOOSE Messages Lack Authentication",
description=(
"GOOSE messages used for protection signaling between IEDs "
"are not authenticated. An attacker on the station bus could "
"inject false trip/close commands to circuit breakers."
),
affected_systems=config.get("goose_publishers", []),
nerc_cip_ref="CIP-005-7 R1.5 - ESP internal communications",
iec_62351_ref="IEC 62351-6 - GOOSE/SV authentication",
remediation=(
"Implement IEC 62351-6 GOOSE authentication using digital "
"signatures. Deploy VLAN isolation for GOOSE traffic as interim."
),
))
self.counter += 1
# MMS service access control
if not config.get("mms_authentication"):
self.findings.append(SubstationFinding(
finding_id=f"SUB-{self.counter:03d}",
severity="high",
category="Protocol Security",
title="MMS Client Connections Lack Authentication",
description=(
"MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification) connections to IEDs "
"do not require client authentication. Any device on the station "
"bus can read/write IED configuration and operate breakers."
),
affected_systems=config.get("mms_servers", []),
nerc_cip_ref="CIP-007-6 R5 - System Access Controls",
iec_62351_ref="IEC 62351-4 - MMS security profiles",
remediation="Enable TLS for MMS connections per IEC 62351-4.",
))
self.counter += 1
# Station bus segmentation
if not config.get("station_bus_segmented"):
self.findings.append(SubstationFinding(
finding_id=f"SUB-{self.counter:03d}",
severity="high",
category="Network Architecture",
title="Flat Station Bus Network Without Segmentation",
description=(
"Station bus connects all IEDs, HMI, engineering access, "
"and WAN gateway on a single VLAN without segmentation."
),
affected_systems=["All station bus devices"],
nerc_cip_ref="CIP-005-7 R1 - ESP boundary",
iec_62351_ref="IEC 62351-10 - Security architecture",
remediation=(
"Segment station bus into VLANs: protection IEDs, "
"measurement IEDs, station HMI, and WAN gateway."
),
))
self.counter += 1
def assess_remote_access(self, config):
"""Assess remote access security for substations."""
if config.get("direct_vendor_access"):
self.findings.append(SubstationFinding(
finding_id=f"SUB-{self.counter:03d}",
severity="critical",
category="Remote Access",
title="Direct Vendor Remote Access to Substation Without MFA",
description=(
"Vendor support has direct VPN access to substation network "
"without traversing an intermediate system or requiring MFA."
),
affected_systems=["Substation WAN gateway"],
nerc_cip_ref="CIP-005-7 R2 - Remote Access Management",
iec_62351_ref="IEC 62351-8 - Role-based access control",
remediation=(
"Route vendor access through corporate jump server with MFA. "
"Implement session recording per CIP-005-7 R2.4."
),
))
self.counter += 1
def generate_report(self):
"""Generate substation assessment report."""
report = []
report.append("=" * 70)
report.append(f"SUBSTATION CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT: {self.name}")
report.append(f"Date: {datetime.now().isoformat()}")
report.append("=" * 70)
for sev in ["critical", "high", "medium", "low"]:
findings = [f for f in self.findings if f.severity == sev]
if findings:
report.append(f"\n--- {sev.upper()} ({len(findings)}) ---")
for f in findings:
report.append(f" [{f.finding_id}] {f.title}")
report.append(f" {f.description[:100]}...")
report.append(f" NERC CIP: {f.nerc_cip_ref}")
report.append(f" Remediation: {f.remediation[:80]}...")
return "\n".join(report)
if __name__ == "__main__":
assessment = SubstationAssessment("Substation Alpha - 345kV")
assessment.assess_iec61850_security({
"goose_authentication": False,
"mms_authentication": False,
"station_bus_segmented": False,
"goose_publishers": ["SEL-411L-01", "SEL-411L-02", "SEL-487E-01"],
"mms_servers": ["SEL-3530-RTAC", "ABB-REF615-01"],
})
assessment.assess_remote_access({
"direct_vendor_access": True,
})
print(assessment.generate_report())
关键概念
| 术语 | 定义 |
|---|---|
| IEC 61850 | 变电站通信网络和系统的国际标准,使用 GOOSE 进行保护信号传输,使用 MMS 进行 SCADA 数据传输 |
| GOOSE | 面向通用对象的变电站事件 - 用于 IED 之间快速点对点保护信号传输的多播协议(跳闸时间 < 4ms) |
| MMS | 制造报文规范 - 用于读取/写入 IED 数据和操作断路器的客户端/服务器协议 |
| IEC 62351 | 电力系统通信协议的安全标准系列,为 IEC 61850、DNP3 和 IEC 104 提供认证和加密 |
| ICCP/TASE.2 | 控制中心间通信协议,用于不同电力公司控制中心之间的数据交换 |
| 同步相量(PMU) | 相量测量单元,提供每秒 30-60 个采样的时间同步电压/电流测量,用于广域监测 |
工具与系统
- Dragos Platform:OT 安全平台,具有针对电网目标组织(ELECTRUM、KAMACITE)的特定威胁情报
- SEL-3620 以太网安全网关:变电站安全设备,提供加密、访问控制和入侵检测
- GRIDsure:由 Idaho National Laboratory 开发的电网网络安全评估框架
- 带 IEC 61850 解析器的 Wireshark:用于变电站中 GOOSE 和 MMS 流量的协议分析
输出格式
Power Grid Cybersecurity Assessment Report
=============================================
Facility: [Name and Type]
NERC Registration: [Entity ID]
BES Impact Rating: [High/Medium/Low]
SUBSTATION FINDINGS: [N]
EMS/SCADA FINDINGS: [N]
COMMUNICATION FINDINGS: [N]
NERC CIP COMPLIANCE:
CIP-002: [Status]
CIP-005: [Status]
CIP-007: [Status]
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