关于 rust-security
面向编码 Agent 的 Rust 安全实践指南,涵盖依赖审计、策略检查、FFI 安全、模糊测试与 Miri 检查。
主要功能
- 01使用 cargo-audit 扫描漏洞
- 02通过 cargo-deny 执行依赖策略
- 03查询 RUSTSEC 安全公告
- 04编写内存安全的 FFI
- 05结合模糊测试与 Miri 检查
适用场景
- 01检查 Rust 项目的依赖漏洞
- 02在 CI 中落实依赖许可与来源规则
- 03审查 Rust 与 C 边界的安全性
- 04对 Rust 库进行模糊测试和未定义行为检查
安装
复制下面的命令,在终端中运行。
$
npx skills add https:/ / github.com/ mohitmishra786/ low-level-dev-skills --skill rust-security安装后在 Claude Code 中输入/rust-security确认已加载。
详细介绍
Rust 安全
用途
指导 Agent 遵循 Rust 安全实践:使用 cargo-audit 审计依赖项,使用 cargo-deny 强制执行策略,了解 RUSTSEC 公告数据库,采用内存安全的 FFI 模式,以及结合模糊测试和 Miri 进行安全审查。
触发条件
- “如何检查 Rust 依赖项是否存在 CVE?”
- “如何使用 cargo-audit?”
- “如何在 CI 中强制执行依赖项策略?”
- “什么是 RUSTSEC 公告数据库?”
- “如何在 Rust 中编写内存安全的 FFI?”
- “如何对 Rust 库进行模糊测试,以查找安全漏洞?”
工作流
1. cargo-audit — 漏洞扫描
# Install
cargo install cargo-audit --locked
# Scan current project
cargo audit
# Full output including ignored
cargo audit --deny warnings
# Audit the lockfile (CI-friendly)
cargo audit --file Cargo.lock
# JSON output for CI integration
cargo audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities.list[].advisory.id'
输出格式:
error[RUSTSEC-2023-0052]: Vulnerability in `vm-superio`
Severity: low
Title: MMIO Register Misuse
Solution: upgrade to `>= 0.7.0`
2. cargo-deny — 策略强制执行
cargo-deny 的功能不止于审计:它还能强制执行许可证策略、禁止特定 crate、检查来源,并验证重复的依赖项版本。
cargo install cargo-deny --locked
# Initialize deny.toml
cargo deny init
# Run all checks
cargo deny check
# Run specific check
cargo deny check advisories
cargo deny check licenses
cargo deny check bans
cargo deny check sources
deny.toml 配置:
[advisories]
vulnerability = "deny" # Deny known vulnerabilities
unmaintained = "warn" # Warn on unmaintained crates
yanked = "deny" # Deny yanked versions
# Ignore specific advisories
ignore = [
"RUSTSEC-2021-0145", # known false positive for our usage
]
[licenses]
unlicensed = "deny"
allow = [
"MIT", "Apache-2.0", "Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
"BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "ISC", "Unicode-DFS-2016",
]
# Deny GPL for proprietary projects
deny = ["GPL-2.0", "GPL-3.0"]
[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn" # Warn if same crate appears twice
wildcards = "deny" # Deny wildcard dependencies
[[bans.deny]]
name = "openssl" # Force rustls instead
wrappers = ["reqwest"] # Allow if only required by these
[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-git = [
"https://github.com/my-org/private-crate",
]
GitHub Actions CI 集成:
- name: Security audit
run: |
cargo install cargo-deny --locked
cargo deny check
3. RUSTSEC 公告数据库
RUSTSEC 数据库位于 https://rustsec.org/,用于跟踪漏洞、无人维护的 crate 和不健全代码。
# Browse advisories from CLI
cargo audit --db ~/.cargo/advisory-db fetch
ls ~/.cargo/advisory-db/crates/
# Check a specific advisory
curl https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0001.json | jq .
# Common categories
# type: vulnerability — exploitable security bug
# type: unmaintained — no longer maintained (supply chain risk)
# type: unsound — documented unsoundness in safe API
# type: yanked — crate version yanked from crates.io
4. 内存安全的 FFI 模式
Rust/C 边界处常见的不安全来源:
// UNSAFE pattern — raw pointer from C, no lifetime
extern "C" fn process_data(data: *const u8, len: usize) {
// Don't do this — no bounds check, no lifetime guarantee
let slice = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, len) };
}
// SAFE pattern — validate before using
extern "C" fn process_data(data: *const u8, len: usize) -> i32 {
// Validate pointer and length
if data.is_null() || len == 0 || len > 1024 * 1024 {
return -1;
}
// Safety: non-null, len validated, called from C with valid buffer
let slice = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, len) };
do_work(slice);
0
}
// Use safe wrapper crates for common patterns
use nix::unistd::read; // safe POSIX wrappers
use windows::Win32::System::Memory::VirtualAlloc; // safe Windows bindings
5. 针对安全漏洞的模糊测试
# cargo-fuzz — libFuzzer-based
cargo install cargo-fuzz
# Initialize
cargo fuzz init
cargo fuzz add my_target
# fuzz/fuzz_targets/my_target.rs
# #![no_main]
# use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
# fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
# if let Ok(s) = std::str::from_utf8(data) {
# let _ = my_lib::parse(s);
# }
# });
# Run fuzzing (long-running)
cargo fuzz run my_target
# With sanitizers for security coverage
cargo fuzz run my_target -- -sanitizer=address
# Reproduce a crash
cargo fuzz run my_target artifacts/my_target/crash-xxxx
# Honggfuzz — good for security targets
cargo install honggfuzz
cargo hfuzz run my_target
6. 使用 Miri 检查健全性
# Install Miri
rustup +nightly component add miri
# Run tests under Miri
cargo +nightly miri test
# Check for UB in unsafe code
MIRIFLAGS="-Zmiri-disable-isolation -Zmiri-backtrace=full" \
cargo +nightly miri test
# Miri detects:
# - Use-after-free
# - Dangling references
# - Invalid pointer arithmetic
# - Data races (with -Zmiri-tree-borrows)
# - Uninitialized memory reads
7. 供应链加固
# Pin Cargo.lock in applications (not libraries)
# Always commit Cargo.lock for binaries
# Verify checksums (cargo already does this)
cargo fetch --locked # fails if Cargo.lock doesn't match
# Audit all dependencies including transitive
cargo tree # view full dependency tree
cargo tree -d # show duplicate versions
# Use cargo-vet for peer review of new deps
cargo install cargo-vet
cargo vet # check all deps have been vetted
# Minimal dependency principle
cargo machete # finds unused dependencies
相关技能
- 使用
skills/rust/rust-sanitizers-miri了解 Miri 和 Sanitizer 详情 - 使用
skills/runtimes/fuzzing了解模糊测试策略和语料库管理 - 使用
skills/rust/rust-unsafe了解不安全代码审计模式 - 使用
skills/rust/cargo-workflows管理 Cargo.lock 和工作区
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